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Augenblick and Custer review the BOT (build,  certainty of the project going forward may warrant
operate, and transfer) approach to building and  the more traditional approach.
financing such infrastructure projects as power plants,  But if a country is unable - or for budgetary or
toll roads, port facilitics, transmission lines, and water  policy reasons prefers not - to finance all needed
supply systems in developing countries.  infrastructurc from budget resources or sovereign
In BOT projects, privatc-sector sponsors - borrowings, the BOT approach is one option.  And in
usually international construction contractors, heavy  the right context it appears to be workable.
equipment suppliers, and plant and system operators,  Moreover, BOT projects should become easier to
often together with local partners - make equity  negotiate and implement as their basic structure is
investments (typically 10-30 percent of the total  better understood and as standard solutions to
project cost) in a private project company that will  common issues becomc more accepted by host
build the project, operate it long enough to pay back  governments and in the marketplace.
the project debt and equity investment, and then  A BOT project may provide some "additionality"
transfer it to the host governmcnL  in tapping sources of private financing that otherwise
The project company raises debt financing  might be unavailable. The sponsors' commitment of
(typically 70-90 percent of project costs) from  substantial equity to a project assures that they will
commercial sources, usually backed by export credit  remain committed to the project's  successful opera-
guarantee agencies and by bilateral and multilateral  Lion  over the concession period.  Their "at-risk"
Icnders. Substantial support from host governments  investment provides a strong incentive to have the
is required.  project perform above its minimum expectations.  If
The BOT approach was developed in the late  the project is properly structured, the benefits of such
1970s in response to constrained developing country  enhanced performance will bc shared with the host
budgets and a downtum in work available for  govemment.  Having the design, implementation, and
international construction firms. Construction firms  operation of a BOT project largely in the private
may no longer be as interested in promoting BOT  sector's hands may provide economies and efficien-
projects as they were earlier.  Many BOT projects  cies that balance or even outweigh the higher financ-
have been proposed, but few have procecded to  ing costs of nonsovereign borrowing and equity
financial closure, lct alone full implementation, in  investment.
developing countries.  But a host government that wants to promote
The BOT formula for infrastructure projects is by  BOT projects must understand and be willing to
no means a panacea, concludc Augenblick and  accept the complexity and time-consuming nature of
Custer. BOT projects are exceedingly complex,  the process, the extensive host government support
financially and legally. If countries can implement  that must be provided, and the rates of return that
the same project in a more traditional way - with  commercial lenders and private equity investors will
sovereign borrowings financing a turnkey construc-  expect.
tion contract-  the time saved and the grcater
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- iv  -SUMMARY
This report revievs the BOT (build, operate and trans-
fer) approach for building and financing infrastructure
projects, such as power plants, toll roads, port facil-
ities, transmission lines, and water supply systems, in
developing countries.
BOT projects involve:
00  Private sector sponsors, usually interna-
tional construction contractors, heavy equip-
ment suppliers, and plant and system opera-
tors, often together with local partners,
00  Making equity investments, typically 10% to
30% of the total project cost, in a
GO  Private project company which will build the
project, operate it for a period of time suf-
ficient to pay back the project debt and
equity investment, and then transfer it to
the host government.
00  Debt financing (typically 70% to 90% of the
total project cost) is raised by the project
company from commercial sources, usually
backed by export credit guarantee agencies,
and from bilateral and multilateral lenders.
00  Senior lenders to the project company typi-
cally are not covered by direct "full faith
and credit" sovereign guarantees, but sub-
stantial support from host governments is
required, including guarantees of the perfor-
mance of government entities involved in the
project and guarantees of foreign exchange
risks.  In some cases, government support has
included a government standby credit facility
to provide subordinated loans to the project
company when necessary to cover senior debt
service.
The BOT approach was developed at the end of the 1970s
as a way for countries with limited sovereign borrowing
capacity and severe budgetary restraints to acquire
needed infrastructure.  A general downturn in work
vavailable for international construction firms seemed
to make these firms particularly eager to promote,
invest in and develop their own projects.  At the cur-
rent time, while the th?-d world debt crisis continues
to restrict sovereign bcrrowings, and while government
budgets are still constrained, international construc-
tion firms are busy and may no longer  be as interested
in promoting BOT projects as they were earlier.
In spite of great interest on the part of host govern-
ments, potential sponsors, lenders and foreign aid
agencies, and although numerous BOT projects have been
proposed, relatively few large infrastructure projects
have actually proceeded to financial close, let alone
been fully implemented in developing countries.
°  Extensive negotiations in Turkey, where the BOT label
was invented, have apparently still not resulted in the
implementation of a single major project.  The negotia-
tions for one cr more large coal fired power plants,
which several times have been announced as virtually
completed, as well as for a metro system and an airport
expansion, are apparently continuing.
3  The governments of Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan,
Thailand and Indonesia continue to show strong interest
in the BOT approach.
-3  ROT  projects are highly complex from both a legal and
financial point of view.  They require potential spon-
sors to spenld  years and millions of dollars on develop-
ment and negotiation.  They present novel  "sues for
many host governments as to the proper all.. tion of
risks and rewards among the parties.
e  Proponents believe that a BOT project, if properly
structured and priced, can provide significant
"additionality" in financial resources for developing
countries while achieving overall cost savings from
efficiencies in design, construction and operation.
°  The World Bank Group has supported the development of
BOT projects in a number of countries.  In addition to
sector studies, feasibility studies and advice for host
governments generally,
Go  The World Bank has provided or has proposed
loans to the governments of Pakistan and the
Philippines which those governments will in
- vi  -turn be able to use to finance or sipport BOT
projects.
00  The World Bank is looking at other ways to
support BOT projects as part of its "Expanded
Cofinancing Operations."
00  IFC is  prepared to act as an investment
banker to host governments or project spon-
sors  and  to makze  equity  investments  in  BOT
projects,  provide  direct  loans  and  underwrite
and  syndicate  commercial  loans.
°°  MIGA is  prepared  to  provide  investment  guar-
antees  to BOT  projects.
Although  there  is  still  too little  experience  with  BOT
projects  to  draw  definite  conclusions,  the  BOT  approach
appears  to offer  one possible  method  for  developing  and
financing  infrastructure  projects  in certain  third
world  countries,  provided  those  countries  are  sophisti-
cated  enough  to deal  with  the technical,  financial  and
l.egal  complexities,  are  willing  to provide  the  neces-
sary  government  support,  and  are sufficiently  credit-
worthy  to attract  the  necessary  private  sector  equity
investment  and  debt financing.
0  Any host  government  contemplating  a BOT  project  should
obtain  expert  counsel  and advice  on the technical,
financial  and  legal  issues  involved.
- vii  -THE BUILD, OPERATE AND TRANSFER ("BOT")
APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE  PROJECTS
IN  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
I.  INTRODUCTION
This report is intended to provide an int, 4 oduction to the
build, operate and transfer {commonly referred to as "BOT")
approach to financing, building and operating infrastructure
projects in  developing countries.  Recent examples of projects
which have been proposed on the BOT model include  power plants,
airports, port facilities, toll roads, metro systems, bridges,
tunnels, water treatment plants, and submarine pipelines and
cables.
In the post-World War II era, most infrastructure  projects
in developing countries have been built under the direct supervi-
sion of the government itself, or of a government agency or util-
ity, and paid for by budgetary resources or sovereign borrowings.
Several trends seem to have converged in the late 1970s and early
1980s leading to an attempt to find an alternative  way to finance
these projects.  First, with continued population and economic
growth in  many developing countries, the need for additional
infrastructure  continues to grow.  Second, the growing third
world debt crisis has meant that developing countries have had
less borrowing capacity and fewer bu^getary resources of their
own to finance the projects that are needed.  Third, major inter-
national contracting firms which, in the middle 1970s, had been
kept very busy, particularly in the oil rich Middle East, were,
by the early 1980s, facing a significant downturn in business.
They were loaking for creative ways to promote additional
projects.  Finally, in the course of the 1980s a number of gov-
ernments as well as international lending institutions  have
become increasingly interested in promoting the development of
the private sector and in the 'privatization' of traditionally
public sector enterprises.The search for a new way to promote and finance infrastruc-
ture projects in  developing countries turned to techniques that
are in fact not all that new.  Similar arrangements, often known
as "concessions," were widely used in the 19th and early 20th
centuries to develop infrastructure in France and many other
parts of the world.  One of the best known projects to be devel-
oped in this way was the Suez Canal, but myriad examples could be
cited of privately financed concessions to build railroads, tram-
ways, water works, electric utilities and so on.
In more modern times, new techniques of providing substan-
tial non-recourse project financing for major privately owned
projects,  particularly in the area of oil  and gas exploration and
extraction, were perfected in the 1970s.  In the United States
and other developed countries, similar project financing tech-
niques have been applied to numerous privately promoted infra-
structure projects, involving power plants, waste disposal facil-
ities, bridges, tunnels, toll roads and office buildings.
Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the
major international contracting firms and some of the more
sophisticated developing countries began to explore the possibil-
ity of  promoting privately owned and operated infrastructure
projects financed on a non-recourse basis under a concession type
arrangement.  The term "BOT" seems to have been coined in the
early 1980s by Turkey's Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to designate a
"build, own and transfer" or a 'build, operate and transfer"
project (the terms are often used interchangeably).  Other vari-
ants include:  BOOT (build,  own, operate a'-'  transfer); BOO
(build, own and operate, i.e., without any obligation to trans-
fer); BRT (build, rent and transfer); BOOST (build,  own, operate,
subsidize and transfer); etc.
-2U7nder  the BOT approach, one or more sponsors from the pri-
vate sector are authorized to create a private "project company"
to build public works.  The sponsors typically include  a major
international engineering and construction firm and one or more
equipment suppliers.  The sponsors will also expect to act as
builders and suppliers for the project.  The project company may
include passive equity investors and even a minority equity par-
ticipation of the host government.
The project company will then raise the bulk of the financ-
ing required for the project from commercial lenders,  usually
supported by export credit guarantee agencies; and from bilateral
and multilateral financial institutions.  The financing is typi-
cally on a "non-recourse"  basis --  that is, the lenders  will have
no financial recourse for repayment of their loans against either
the project sponsors (i.e., in the normal case the shareholders
of the project company) or the host government.  Recourse is lim-
ited to the project company and its  assets, including real
estate, plant and equipment and whatever contractual rights, per-
formn4ce bonds, insurance  and government guarantees the project
company has been able to obtain.
The project company  will own and operate the facility for a
period of time which is intended to be sufficient to pay off the
debt incurred and to provide a reasonable return to the equity
investors.  At the end of this period, the project company will
transfer ownership of the project to the host government.
This report will focus on the BOT approach for infrastruc-
ture projects in  developing countries.  Thus it will not discuss
various types of privately owned projects built with non-recourse
financing in the industrial,  commercial, oil and gas, or mining
sectors.  The fact that goods or raw materials produced by such
non-infrastructure projects can be sold in a competitive world
-3-market  and for  foreign  currency  generally  makes  these  projects
easier  to finance  on a non-recourse  basis  than  infrastructure
projects. Nor  will  .e  report  treat  BOT infrastructure  projects
in  developed  countries,  such  as the  Channel  Tunnel  between  the
United  K.ngdom  and France  or the  various  bridge  and tunnel
projects  currently  under  construction  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Aus-
tralia  and  elsewhere. While  these  projects  do serve,  in  some
sense,  as  models  for  similar  projects  in  developing  countries,
the  typical  political  and  economic  uncertainties  in a  developing
country  environment  raise  additional  obstacles  to the BOT
approach  which  are  generally  not  present  in  developed  country
projects.
When  first  conceived  by Prime  Minister  Ozal,  and in  the
optimistic  view  of some  host  country  governments  even  today,  a
major  attraction  of the  BOT  approach  was  supposed  to be that  a
BOT  project  would  be entirely  "privately"  financed,  without  any
financial  commitment  from  the  host  government. In  practice,  how-
ever,  there  has not  yet  been  a purely  private  BOT infrastructure
project  of any  significant  size in  a developing  country. Exten-
sive  host  government  support,  including  a  substantial  financial
commitment  at one  or more  stages  of the  process,  appears  to  be a
central  requirement.
This  report  has been  prepared  generally  from  secondary
sources  publicly  available. These  sources  are  listed  in  Annex  4.
We have  had the  benefit  of the  views  of a number  of people  who
have  been involved  in  negotiating  and imolementing  BOT  projects.
We have  not,  however,  been  able  to review  the  actual  contractual
documentation  for  any  of the  BOT  projects  discussed. Nor have  we
had access  to  detailed  financial  information  that  would  allow  us
to evaluate  the  true  cost  of BOT  projects  and  to compare  those
costs  with infrastructure  projects  financed  directly  by host  gov-
ernments. Finally,  because  there  is  often  a time  lag  between  the
-4-happening cf events and reports in the press, some of our infor-
mation as to the status of particular projects is no doubt
already out of date.
The purpose of the report is not to make any definitive
judgments about BOT projects or their future.  Rather, it is to
provide an overview of the BOT approach and to raise a number of
the issues  which should be considered by anyone involved in
deciding whether or how to implement  a project on a BOT basis.
The report will draw on various existing or proposed SOT projects
for illustrative  purposes.  Specific projects are not discussed
in detail in the report itself,  although Annex 1 provides a par-
tial listing of BOT infrastructure  projects in developing coun-
tries which have been reported in the press, Annex 2 reviews a
few of the major projects in  more detail, and Annex 3, prepared
by Mr. Jean-Jacques Lecat of Bureau Francis Lefebvre in Paris,
provides a brief overview of BOT projects which have been pro-
posed in  Turkey.
II.  BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BOT PROJECTS
Although no two BOT projects will be exactly alike, there
are generally a set of basic characteristics and a generic struc-
ture for a BOT project which can be summarized as follows.
(Table I  on the next page provides a schematic diagram for a typ-
ical SOT project.)
2.1  Host Government.  The most important  participant in any
BOT infrastructure  project is the host government.  The host gov-
ernment must want the BOT project.  A half-hearted commitment
will not be sufficient.  To no less degree than in a tradition-
ally financed infrastructure  project, the host government remains
the ultimate client or purchaser of the project.
-5-Table  I
BOT  PROJECT  STRUCTURE
|  Host  Govemment |--  Investment  Bankers  i
Sponsors  ~~~~~~~~~Legal  Counsel
Sponsors  Technical  Advisers
AdV
Equity  kwstnun  Raw  Material/ ivestment  BankerS  Sh__W1ftW  Agr"'s"O  Energy  Suppliers Legal Counsel  _______
Passive Equity  \  E  9  g  o  Cw*vd
'nvestors  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  Cntrcto  Consorteu  l
Export  C  tInsurers
La  TOM OffTom\_ 
Purchaser  lV4  Prooject  C,ompany 
Escrow  Ajent  Agnce
-LendersTrustee
\~~~~~GW*  Consftrston  ConsortiumXv
X  ~~~~~~~~~Equipment  Suppliers
Export  Credlt|
Gurnty  Agencies 
- 6  -The host government will normally have to authorize the
project in the first instance,  which often will require special
legislation  and specific goverrnmental  approvals.  The host gov-
ernment or one of its agencies will normally enter into an elabo-
rate implementation  or concession agreement with the project com-
pany which will spell out in  detail the support to be provided by
the host government and the rights and obligations of the project
company.  The host government may be providing part of the
financing, either as debt, equity or on a-standby basis.  It or
one of its agencies  may be purchasing the output of the project
or providing financial guarantees as to revenues.  Finally, it
will undoubtedly be called upon to provide all sorts of other
types of support to the project.  Thus, where developing coun-
tries and infrastructure  projects are concerned, the BOT approach
cannot be expected to result in a purely private sector venture
which can be realized without substantial exposure or commitment
on the part of the host government.  The range of host government
support normally required is  discussed in  greater detail in
Chapter III below.
2.2  Sponsors; Proiect Company.  The second essential ingre-
dient for a successful BOT project is a financially  strong, expe-
rienced sponsor, or group of sponsors, who will form the project
company.  The project company  may own the underlying assets
required for the project for the life of the concession or oper-
ate the assets under a form of lease.  Sponsors usually form a
consortium which includes a major international construction and
engineering firm and one or more suppliers of heavy equipment.
The consortium may include  a separate firm interested in operat-
ing and maintaining the project under an operating contract.
The process of developing a BOT project is immensely compli-
cated, time consuming and expensive.  The Bechtel group, for
example, claims to have spent some US$7 million over nearly five
-7years in its unsuccessful attempts to pursue, on a BOT basis, a
power plant and a port project in Turkey.  Kumagai Gumi report-
edly spent the equivalent of some US$5 million in pre-signing
costs on a toll road project in Thailand.  Because of the high
costs involved --  for feasibility  studies, financial and legal
advisers, travel expense, executive time, etc. --  sponsors inter-
ested in a BOT project must have patience and staying power.
They should work out early in the process a cost sharing arrange-
ment among the members of the consortium for the initial  develop-
ment costs.
Many sponsors who have been involved in BOT projects cite
the need to form the project company at an early stage so that
it, rather than one or more of the individual sponsors, can nego-
tiate with the various parties which will be involved:  the host
government;  the sponsors themselves acting as construction con-
tractors, suppliers or operators; lenders; insurers; other equity
investors;  and so on.  If the project company includes "indepen-
dent" equity investors  not otherwise engaged in the project
(e.g., investment  bankers, a multilateral or bilateral lending
agency, or the host government) or a sufficient balance of inter-
ests, it  may more easily succeed in acting independently of any
one investor  or sponsor and negotiating  at arm's length with each
of them.
An equity participation by the host government may be useful
in this regard and may help the host government feel that the
project is being negotiated fairly and with full disclosure.  On
the other hand, some promoters of the BOT concept believe that
inclusion  of the host government among the project company share-
holders can lead to the sort of bureaucratic interference with
project  development and operations that "privatization" is sup-
posed to avoid.
-8-2.3  Financial Viability.  The financial viability of a BOT
project over its intended  life must be clearly demonstrable to
potential equity investors and lenders.  This means that the
project must have a clear and certain source of revenue that will
be sufficient (a) to service principal and interest payments on
the project debt over the term of the various loans and (b) to
provide a return of and on equity which is commensurate with
whatever development and long term project risk the equity inves-
tors are being asked to-take.  In the case of a power plant, the
source of revenue will normally be a long term off-take contract
with a government owned utility.  In the case of roads, tunnels
and bridges, the source of revenue will either be the tolls which
can be generated (perhaps  with a minimum level of traffic being
guaranteed by the host government) or some sort of similar peri-
odic payments by the host government or other users (e.g., rail-
roads)  based on future traffic.  In the case of water distribu-
tion systems, the source of revenue may either be payments made
by a government authority or direct sales to consumers.
Since the revenue  must be sufficient to service the project
debt, the total cost of the project must be reasonably predict-
able, and investors and lenders must have confidence that the
project can actually be built and operated as planned.  Normally
plant and equipment will be provided and constructed on a fixed
cost turnkey basis.  Also, normally only proven technology will
be used.  Experimental techniques or untried, "state of the art"
technology is less likely to be approved by lenders who are being
asked to commit substantial sums on a limited recourse basis.
2.4  Local Partners.  A number of participants in BOT
projects have spoken of the advisability of including among the
sponsors or equity investors in the project company a strong,
well connected and well respected private participant from the
host country.  Such a participant might be a potential supplier
-9-of civil works to the project, but also might be a strong local
industrial,  commercial or financial group.  Such a local partner
can help the sponsors better understand the local environment,
better deal with the host government and better resolve local
issues  as they arise.  A local partner can also provide needed
logistical  support during the development stage of the project.
2.5  Construction Consortium.  At the heart of the typical
BOT  project is  a large building job often involving the supply of
considerable  heavy equipment.  Because of the need to assure
equity investors  and lenders that the project will be built on
time and at an agreed cost, both the building contractor and the
principal equipment suppliers will normally be companies of
proven reliability,  expertise and financial strength.
Often members of the consortium will come from a number of
different countries.  While perhaps not essential, this is help-
ful in two ways.  From the host country's perspective, it assures
that the project is an 'international' one, rather than one which
might appear to benefit a single, particular foreign country.
This may make the project more acceptable politically.  Having
suppliers from a number of different developed countries also
helps to attract financing supported by different export credit
guarantee agencies, thereby spreading a risk which no one agency
would be likely to take on entirely.
2.6  Financing.  Most BOT projects proposed or agreed to
date have involved  a combination of equity provided by the spon-
sors and debt provided by commercial banks, international finan-
cial institutions  and bilateral government lenders.  The percent-
age of equity  seems to fall most often within the range of 10% to
30%, although the equity component in some projects has been out-
side this range.  It is entirely conceivable to have a BOT
project without any substantial true equity, but rather with
- 10  -various levels of senior and subordinated debt.  The senior lend-
ers (e.g.,  normally the commercial banks) will want to have a
"cushion" to support their senior debt, but may not be too con-
cerned  whether that cushion is in the form of subordinated debt
or equity.  The host government will normally want to have some
form of long term financial commitment from the sponsors through
the operating period.  The precise form of that commitment (sub-
ordinated debt, invested equity, equity in the form of deferred
fees) may not be crucial.  International lending agencies, how-
ever, are more likely to demand that a significant part of the
financing  be provided in the form of more traditional equity
invested  at the outset.
The proportion between foreign currency and local currency
in both the debt and equity financing will depend on the nature
of the  project and the country involved.  The ability of the
local  banking and securities markets to mobilize local capital or
the availability  of "blocked" local currency in existing external
commercial  debt which can be recycled in swap transactions may
also influence the mix between local and foreign currency in any
given project.
The financing for some BOT projects appears to recognize the
fact that SOT projects tend to have two distinct phases, with
different risks:  first, a high risk construction phase, and,
second, a lower risk, "public utility" operating phase.  Both
equity investors and lenders can be expected to seek different
rewards  and require  different guarantees depending upon which of
these two different phases they are investing in.
2.7  Security to Lenders.  One of the key challenges to be
met in a BOT project is how to provide adequate security to non-
recourse  or limited recourse lenders. An infrastructure project
differs dramatically from the typical large commercial real
- 11  -estate project well known in the United States in which non-
recourse lenders will often conisider  themselves adequately
secured simply by the right to foreclose on the project real
estate, plant and equipment in the event of default.  In the BOT
context, non-recourse lenders rightly fear that, if the project
company defaults, there will be no ready market for a partly
built toll road or tunnel or a power plant that does not work.
Various security devices, therefore, are typically found in BOT
projects to protect the senior lenders.  By and large, to the
degree that these devices are designed to ensure that the project
remains financially viable, and therefore performs as intended,
these protections are also in the overall interest of the host
government.
First, project revenues are usually collected in one or more
escrow accounts, maintained by an escrow agent which is indepen-
dent of the project company, for payment according to stipulated
priorities.  The lenders normally insist that from-the beginning
a special debt reserve escrow account be established, built up
and maintained sufficient to pay senior debt service for a mini-
mum period (six  months or longer) before any distributions can be
made to equity investors.
Second, the benefits of the various contracts entered into
by the project company (e.Q., the turnkey construction contract,
performance bonds, supplier warranties, insurance proceeds, etc.)
will normally be assigned to a trustee for the benefit of the
lenders.
Third, lenders will probably insist upon the right to take
over the project in the case of financial or technical default,
well prior to the "bankruptcy" stage, and to bring in new con-
tractors, suppliers or operators (depending upon the nature of
the default) to complete the project.  Juridically, this would
- 12 -normally be accomplished by having the project company's equity
owners pledge all of their stock as security for the loans.  By
foreclosing  on the stock, the lenders would become owners of the
project company.
Finally, as explained in  more detail in Chapter III, commer-
cial lenders and bilateral export credit agencies may insist on
measures of government support, such as standby subordinated loan
facilities,  which are functionally almost equivalent to sovereign
guarantees of project risk.
2.8  Transfer to Host Government.  The typical BOT project
requires that ownership be transferred to the host government at
the end of the agreed concession period.  What such "ownership"
may consist of, and therefore what precisely needs to be trans-
ferred, will vary from project to project.  In some cases, the
project company will actually own the land, plant and equipment
which make up the project.  In others, it  .would  appear that the
host government may have retained "ownership" in the land and
provided some type of leasehold interest to the project company.
In that case, it  might be more accurate to speak  of the reversion
of the underlying land tc the host government, rather than a
'transfer," although normally the improvements (i.e.,  plant and
equipment) would still be "transferred."
The transfer may require a final payment to the equity
investors from the host government.  Such payment is likely to be
based on financial criteria --  i.e., the amount required to pro-
vide the equity return to the owners which was originally negoti-
ated (provided performance has been satisfactory) --  rather than
on the then fair market value of the project.  Such payment
should also be conditioned on an inspection of the project prop-
erty and certification that it  has been properly maintained and
is still in good working order.  Where distributions to the
- 13  -equity investors over the concession period are projected to be
sufficient to provide both a reasonable return on and a return of
the original equity investment, the final transfer could require
only a token payment.  In that case, the project company's obli-
gations to maintain the project in good working order would have
to be enforced in other ways, e.g., perhaps by yearly inspections
and certifications as a condition to the continued right to
operate.
There might also be a movable transfer date, with earlier
transfer if the project company exceeds projections and realizes
its full equity return earlier than expected, or a longer conces-
sion period if expected returns to the equity investors have not
been reached because of factors beyond their control.
III.  HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
As indicated above, strong host government support, includ-
ing  most often a substantial financial commitment, appears to be
an essential ingredient for the development and implementation  of
a  BOT project.  The discussion which follows highlights the areas
in which such support may be required and raises some of the
issues  which host governments will be asked by sponsors and lend-
ers to help resolve.
3.1  Political and Bureaucratic Support.  The host govern-
ment must provide powerful bureaucratic support to be able to
resolve various regulatory and other issues as they arise.  Nor-
mally a single person or department within the executive branch
of the host country government must be prepared to act as a men-
tor for the project.  The mentor must have sufficient political
clout and bureaucratic ability to maintain continuing support
over the life of the project and to override bureaucratic opposi-
tion.  Such opposition often comes from the established public
- 14 -sector entity which would otherwise build and operate the project
(e.g., the government utility, public works administration, high-
way authority, etc.).
Another layer of complexity is added if new legislation is
required from the host country's national parliament in order to
implement the BOT project in question.  In such a case, the
chances for success will be greatest if the host government can
obtain broad legislative authority and a delegation of powers to
someone in the executive branch who can then carry through the
development and implementation  of the project.  If SOT sponsors
are required to lobby their own bill through a national parlia-
ment, the chances of ultimate success will be considerably
diminished.
The host government must assign sufficiently trained and
experienced personnel to understand the complexities of a BOT
scheme and to be able to negotiate its terms.  The government
negotiators must be of sufficiently high rank and have sufficient
authority to commit their governments or government agencies to
the terms of the transaction in a timely manrter. Otherwise, the
negotiations are likely to drag on so long that the project may
be abandoned.  Even if it is eventually implemented, the delay
will have imposed substantial lost opportunity costs.
3.2  Outside Advisers.  Given the unusual technical, finan-
cial and legal complexities of BOT projects, host governments
should retain at the outset competent outside technical, finan-
cial and legal advisers familiar with the types of private sector
arrangements involved.  The project sponsors will themselves have
substantial technical expertise and will have experienced inter-
national legal counsel and investment bankers on their side of
the negotiating table.  No matter how experienced  or sophisti-
cated the government negotiators may be, by adding outside
- 15 -technical advisers, investment  bankers and legal counsel of stat-
ure to their team from the outset, the host government will nor-
mally be better able to structure the initial BOT proposal in the
most favorable way for the government.  The presence of such
advisers will ler.d  considerable  credibility to the host
government's negotiating position as the proposal evolves and
should help to find creative solutions to problems which arise in
the course of the negotiations.  Although the cost of employing
such outside advisers will be considerable, the resulting bene-
fits in any significant BOT project will normally be well worth
it.
3.3  Assured Supplies.  In most BOT projects, the host gov-
ernment will provide some level of logistical support.  For exam-
ple, the government may provide the land on which the project
will be built; road, rail or port facilities; transmission lines
to take power from a power plant; raw materials and utilities
under long term supply contr&cts; or even free supplies of energy
(e.q., locally  mined coal) over the life of the project.
3.4  Assured Revenues.  Even more crucial, the host govern-
ment will often be the sole purchaser of the output of a BOT
project.  For instance, in the case of power plants, the power
will normally be sold into the government owned power grid.
Since an assured revenue stream is essential to persuade both
equity investors and lenders to commit their funds, the host gov-
ernment or its wholly owned utility will normally be required to
enter into a binding long term agreement with the BOT project
company to purchase power (or to pay for capacity) on a "take or
pay" basis sufficient, at a minimum, to pay off the project debt
and pay back the equity investors.  Normally, the sponsors will
insist that this off-take agreement be backed by the "full faith
and credit" of the host government.
- 16  -The formula for pricing the payments due under a power off-
take agreement will vary.  Turkey and Pakistan appear to have
included in their proposed BOT projects a power tariff formula
which starts with input and financing costs (subject  to price
escalation clauses  over the li5e of the agreement) and derives a
'"cost  plus" price for both a capacity charge per kwh and an addi-
tional kwh charge for energy actually taken.  The Philippines, on
the other hand, appears to be soliciting bids based on a flat
rate per kwh for both a  capacity-fee and an energy fee to be set
by the bidder.  The implication is that the Philippines would
then accept the lowest bid without negotiating precisely how the
bid has been derived.
The problem is somewhat different where a BOT project will
be selling its goods or services directly to the public rather
than to the host government.  In the case of a toll road, for
instance, the senior lenders may be reluctant to take the risk
that the volume of toll paying traffic will be too low to pay off
the debt.  The equity investors  may also be reluctant to take
significant risks in this regard, unless they are given a chance
to reap significant rewards if traffic  meets or exceeds projec-
tions.  One solution to this problem is for the host government
to agree to provide subordinated loans to the project company
whenever toll revenues fall below a certain minimum.  This seems
to be the solution being used in the North-South Expressway
project in Malavsia.  The host government may have sufficient
budgetary resources to be able to make such a commitment on its
own.  If this is not the case, a standby facility, such as the
one in the power sector in Pakistan financed by a World Bank
loan, might be needed to solve this problem.  Another solution is
to provide additional revenue to the project company from some
other source, e.q., increasing revenue sharing from other sectors
- 17 -of the toll road system.  This is the solution apparently being
proposed for the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway.
3.5  Loans: Equity Contributions.  It is not incompatible
with the coincept  of a SOT project to have the host government
fund part of the project costs by direct loans to or an equity
investment in the project company.  in the  case of the North-
South Expressway in Malaysia, for instance, the government is
providing a substantial  support loan for ten years.  In the case
of a power project in Pakistan, the government was expected to
provide a subordinated loan of up to 30% of the total estimated
project cost.  In the case of the proposed Gazi power project in
Turkey,l/ the government had proposed to take 30% of the equity
in the project.
Opinion  is divided as to whether having ti,a  host government
as an equity partner in  a SOT project is  iielpful. One view is
that BOT projects should be completely privately financed and
privately run.  In this view, having the government as an equity
partner is likely to bring undue government influence and lead to
"bureaucratic" inefficiencies in management and operation.
The other view is that having the government as an equity
partner may be quite helpful.  It may help to make the project
company independent  of any one of its sponsors and better able to
negotiate with its  major shareholders for construction contracts
and equipment supplies.  It should help to convince the host gov-
ernment of the transparency of the project's financial structure
(which  may be needed as a quid pro auo for the government support
being sought).  It  may make it easier for the government to allow
I/  The Gazi project is  used for illustrative  purposes in this
report, even though it now seems to have been abandoned, because
substantial information  about it was made public.  See Annexes 2
and 3 for more details.
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system of penalties and rewards based on the degree to which the
project  meets or exceeds projections, when the government itself
will share in such risks and rewards.
3.6  Earning Assets.  A familiar feature of a number of SOT
projects has been the contribution  by the host government of
existing assets capab]e of producing earnings which can be used
to pay capital costs, debt service and operating expenses.  To
borrow examples from developed countries, in both the Dartford
crossing project in the United Kingdom and the Sydney Harbor tun-
nel project in  Australia, existing toll bridges or tunnels were
made available to the project company by the host government so
that the tolls could be used to finance the new project.  Like-
wise, in the case of the North-South Expressway project in Malay-
sia and the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway project in Thailand,
tolls from existing toll roads will be made available to the
project company.
3.7  Regulatory, Fiscal and Other Su2ort.  There is a wide
range of legislative, regulatory, fiscal and similar support
which a host government should be prepared to provide to a BOT
project.  The government may have to provide basic legislative
and regulatory authority for the project to be built and operated
in the private sector, since often government monopolies will be
involved.  Special legislation  may be required to authorize the
private ownership and operation of power plants, toll roads,
telecommunications  facilities, airports, water works, and so on.
The authority to acquire land for the project by eminent domain
may need to be specially provided.  These various authorizations
may be provided by general legislation  or by a "single  purpose"
law or decree providing all of the necessary powers and authori-
zations for the BOT project in  question.  As indicated above, the
chances for success will be greatest if general legislative
- 19  -authority can be obtained early in the process, with power being
delegated for implementation  to a responsible official who is
prepared to act as the host government's mei.tor  for the project.
To attract foreign equity investment  and non-recourse debt
financing, foreign investors  have to be satisfied that the host
country has an overall legal and regulatory system which is con-
ducive to foreign investment.  This normally presupposes an
ascertainable and stable system of law, supported by a court sys-
tem in which private party litigants can seek redress.  For exam-
ple, labor laws are required which allow private sector employers
to hire and fire employees and workers on a reasonable basis at
reasonable  cost.
In the tax area, the host government  will often make avail-
able to the BOT project a special regime.  Standard features of
such regimes are a waiver of local income  tax on the project com-
pany for the concession period, a waiver of any withholding tax
on  interest  and dividends paid to foreign investors and a reduc-
tion or elimination  of local income  tax on the salaries of expa-
triate  personnel required to staff the project.  The rationale
for providing such tax benefits is that foreign investors will
look at the returns they are seeking net of local tax.  Thus any
tax payable will simply increase  the overall cost of the project
which normally the government will be paying directly (e.Q., in
the power tariff) or indirectly (e.g.,  when a toll road project
must charge higher tolls or provide a longer concession period to
the project company).  Similarly, the rationale for providing
local tax relief for expatriate personnel is that the project
company  will normally have to reimburse expatriate personnel for
the additional burden of local taxes.  Stich  reimbursement will
then become part of the overall cost of the project which, one
way or another, will be passed on to the host government or the
local public.
- 20 -3.8  Prolect Risk.  Most foreign lenders (and their export
credit guarantee agencies) have been reluctant to accept any sub-
stantial project risk in BOT infrastructure projects in  develop-
ing countries.  The host government, therefore, will normally be
asked to protect the senior lenders against the risk that their
debt will not be serviced due to project failure.  The solution
which seems to be emerging for providing this protection, and
which is a common feature  of the coal fired power plant projects
in  Turkey, the North-South Expressway in  Malaysia and other BOT
projects, is for the host government to commit to make subordi-
nated loans available on a standby basis over a certain period of
time to provide for senior  debt service when and if the project
company's cash flow is insufficient for such propose.
3.9  Force Maieure.  Force maieure risks which cannot rea-
sonably be covered by insurance  pose a dilemma.  Foreign lenders
will rarely be willing to take force maleure risks.  Equity
investors,  unless they are offered considerably more upside
potential than a 16% to 18% return, are also going to be reluc-
tant to take force maieure risks, and will certainly not guaran-
tee the lenders against force maieure risks except to the limit
of their own equity investment.  Thus some form of government
support will normally be required to cover force maieure risks.
The standby facility which the Turkish government had agreed
to in the Gazi project reportedly would have operated to cover
shortfalls due to force maieure events as well as other cases of
shortfall, but would have protected only the lenders, not the
equity investors.  In the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway project
in  Thailand, the government has apparently provided in the con-
cession agreement for a number of "exceptional events," whic"
would include  uninsurable force majeure events, in which one or
more remedies, as appropriate,  would be available to allow both
lenders  and equity investors  to recover their investments.
- 21 -3.10  Inflation.  Both lenders and equity investors will
normally insist  on some mechanism to protect themselves against
inflation risk.  This protection may be provided by price escala-
tion clauses in the off-take agreement (e.2., in the case of
power projects) or by provisions in the concession agreement
allowing the project company to increase tolls (e.g., in a toll
road project).  Such price escalation clauses would attempt to
take account of increased  costs of the project due to inflation.
-They  may also be drafted with the intent of maintaining the pur-
chasing power of the project's net income and equity generally.
Normally such protection is not complete.  Price adjustments are
allowed only periodically, lagging behind actual inflation, and
may only be partial.  The negotiation of the precise terms of the
price escalation formulas in BOT projects will probably be time
consuming and extremely detailed.
3.11  Foreign Exchange.  Typically a BOT infrastructure
project, which will be selling its output into the local economy,
will receive its earnings in local currency.-  Both lenders and
equity investors  who have invested in foreign currency will want
firm assurances that they will be able to recoup their original
investment,  together with interest or dividends, in the same or a
comparable foreign currency, and that they will be able to do so
at a reasonable exchange rate.  The host government, therefore,
must be prepared to provide some mechanism to assure the foreign
investors (and their government insurance agencies) that they
will be authorized to convert local currency earnings into for-
eign currency, that there will be enough foreign currency avail-
able when the time comes for the host country or its banking
2/  Where a project will have foreign users who can be charged
in foreign currencies, as in the case of airports or port facili-
ties, this problem may be less severe.
- 22 -system to make the conversion and that the rate will not be
unduly unfavorable.
These issues  have been resolved in different ways in recent
BOT projects.  In  Turkey, for instance, for the Gazi project, the
host government proposed that its power authority would malce  its
periodic payments under the off-take contract in a basket of cur-
rencies, consisting of Japanese yen, German marks and U.S. dol-
lars,  designed to match the payments required to be made to dif-
ferent foreign lenders and investors.  In another country, on the
other hand, the government intends to rely principally upon an
exchange risk insurance scheme operated by the Central Bank, with
the  premium (e.g.,  3% per annum in the case of U.S. dollars)
being an additional cost of financing and thus an additional cost
to be covered in the power tariff.  In return for the annual pre-
mium, the Central Bank guarantees that it will convert local cur-
rency earned by the investor into dollars at the exchange rate
fixed on the date the insurance contract is entered into.  If for
any reason such insurance is not available, it appears that the
government of this country has considered having the power tariff
adjusted for exchange rate movements (actually for the greater of
inflation or exchange rate loss).
The ratio of foreign currency to local currency to be
invested in a BOT project will differ significantly from project
to project.  A power plant, because of the heavy equipment
invalved  which usually must be imported, will normally require a
relatively large proportion of foreign currency.  In a toll road
project, however, much of the investment can be made in local
currency, if  sources of financing are available.  Thus the plans
for the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway indicate that at most 10%
of the needed investment might come from foreign currency loans.
In such a situation, foreign exchange risk becomes more manage-
able and may not need host government support.  In the Bangkok
- 23  -project, for instance, it  does not appear that any specific gov-
ernment support of exchange rates was required.  In the North-
South Expressway project in Malaysia, however, in  which appar-
ently a substantial amount of foreign currency borrowing is con-
templated, the government has provided a 17 year external risk
undertaking to cover increased costs from adverse foreign
exchange  movements and adverse interest rate movements on foreign
loans to the project.
3.12  Sovereign Guarantees.  Although host governments will
not normally provide a sovereign guarantee for the loans made to
a BOT project company, they will be asked to provide sovereign
guarantees, or equivalent assurances, for some aspects of the
project.  For instance, if a government-owned corporation has
contracted with the project company, as when a government utility
enters into a long term off-take contract or undertakes the long
term supply of fuel or energy to the project, the government
itself  will often be required to guarantee the utility's perfor-
mance.  Moreover, the basic concession agreement between the host
government and the project company will normally contain numerous
obligations undertaken by the host government which will be
backed by its "full faith and credit."
3.13  Protection from Competition.  Finally, the host gov-
ernment may have to provide some assurances as to the competitive
environment in  which a BOT project will operate.  In the case of
a toll road project, for instance, the project sponsors would
normally want assurances as to any parallel toll or non-toll
roads which might be built during the concession period.  Even in
the case of a power plant project, in which the government will
be committed under a long term off take contract to take or pay
for a certain minimum amount of power, the equity investors will
normally be counting on making their profits from selling more
than these minimum amounts.  They will want some commitments,
- 24 -therefore, from the host government as to how many other poten-
tially competing sources of energy will be allowed to function
during the concession period.
IV.  RISK ALLOCATION
A BOT project has a.  number of identifiable risks.  Some are
reasonably within the control of one or more of the parties to
the project.  Others may not be within any party's reasonable
control, but may be insurable, at a cost.  Still others may not
be insurable.  The conventional wisdom in project financing gen-
erally is that each risk should be assumed by the party within
whose control the risk most lies.  Usually a party will insist on
some reward commensurate with the risk undertaken.  The typical
risks in a BOT project are summarized below.
4.1  Completion Risk.  The risk that the project will be
completed on time and for the price stated is normally covered by
a  fixed price, firm date, turnkey construction contract with
stipulated liquidated damages,-/ often supplemented by perfor-
mance bonds.  The price of the turnkey project is,  of course,
increased by a risk factor to compensate the contractor for tak-
ing this risk.  Completion risk is assumed secondarily by the
project company, and indirectly by its equity investors, since
their equity will be eroded to the degree that costs are
increased  due to delays or cost overruns which are not covered by
damages from the contractors.  Whether any completion risk will
be assumed, at a third level, by lenders to BOT projects has been
a vexing question.
3/  A liquidated damages clause attempts to set forth precisely
in the contract the monetary damages payable by the contractor on
account, for example, of each day of delay in completing the
project, or for the completed project's failure to meet
specifications.
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bilateral lenders, and the export credit guarantee agencies which
guarantee commercial loans, have been reluctant to assume comple-
tion risk.  In several instances, as a condition to making their
loans, they have required undertakings from the host government
to make subordinated loans to the project company sufficient to
guarantee senior debt service through  project completion.
While BOT purists may argue that such standby commitments
vitiate the private, non-recourse nature of the BOT approach,
from the host government's point of view such contingent commit-
ments may be the most economical alternative.  For example, in
theory, commercial standby subordinated debt financing might be
arranged to take the place of a government standby facility.  Any
such financing, however, would surely reauire high interest rates
and commitment fees to compensate for the risks being undertaken.
It is also theoretically possible that some sponsors would agree
to provide standby equity commitments to cover completion risk.
As a practical matter, however, equity investors  are likely to
accept such a commitment only in exchange for substantial poten-
tial rewards.  Venture capitalists in a private project of this
nature in a developed country, such as the United States, would
expect annual returns of 35% to 40% on equity for taking such
risks.  In a developing country, the potential returns would have
to be even higher.  Host governments probably will not want to
pay this high a price.  They may prefer, therefore, to supply the
standby commitment themselves.
4.2  Performance and OperatinQ Risk.  The risk that the
project will not perform as expected will be covered by warran-
ties from the consortium of construction contractors and equip-
ment suppliers and by performance guarantees in an operating and
maintenance contract.  In each case, these risks are substan-
tially within the control of the parties assuming them.  As with
- 26 -completion risk, however, operating risk is again assumed second-
arily by the project company.  Whether lenders will assume any
operating risk, which from their point of view becomes important
only when operating or performance failures lead to interruptions
in cash flow, is discussed in the next section.
4.3  Cash Flow Risk.  As indicated  earlier, lenders to BOT
projects will insist upon elaborate escrow arrangements to cover
forward  debt service and to guard against possible interruptions
or ups and downs in cash flow.  Some lenders have been prepared,
however, to lend on a fully non-recourse basis (i.e., non-
recourse other than to the project company and its assets) to a
project in its operating phase, once construction is complete and
normal operations begin.  For instance, in the proposed financing
of the Gazi project in Turkey, the government's standby obliga-
tion to provide subordinated loans during construction and
start-up would have fallen away after three years of successful
operation (provided sufficient balances had been built up in the
escrow accounts to cover forward senior debt service for approxi-
mately three years).
As an alternative to standby commitments from the host gov-
ernment, commercial insurance is available in the London  market
to cover cash flow risk in BOT type projects (see Section 4.5
below).  The cost of such insurance would, however, become part
of the overall cost of the project and would inevitably  be
reflected in higher revenue payments to the project company.  In
the case of a power project, for instance, there would be a
higher cost of power to the host government in the off-take
agreement.  Thus a host government may find it more economical to
bear this risk itself, if need be, through a mechanism such as a
standby subordinated loan facility, rather than allowing a
project company to obtain, and be reimbursed for the cost of,
commercial insurance.
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investors and lenders to a project in a developing country will
be concerned about the risks associated with inflation and for-
eign exchange.  These investors  will argue that such risks are
totally beyond their control and should be the government's
responsibility.  In a typical BOT project, the potential rewards
to lenders and equity investors will nct be great enough to ccm-
pensate them for taking either inflation  or foreign exchange
risks.  Local investors  mav be content with protection on'ly
against inflation.  Foreign investors will want protection
against both inflatior.  and adverse changes in exchange rates.
As indicated in Chapter III, the host government has often
been prevailed upon to cover these risks.  Tio  cover inflation,
the long term off-take contract (in the case of a power plant) or
the agreement with the host government as to mi.-mum revenues to
be collected from the public (in the case of toll roads or a
port) will normally provide for periodic adjustments in the price
of the goods or services to be sold by the project based on some
relevant index of local inflation.  The host government will also
normally be required to guarantee convertibility, the availabil-
ity of sufficien-t  foreign exchange and the exchange rate.  As
not-ed  earlier, the precise mechanisms used to achieve these guar-
antees will vary.
4.5  Insurable Risks.  A BOT project typically will have
casualty insurance covering its plant and equipment, third party
liability insurance,  workmen's compensation insurance, and insur-
ance covering other commercially insurable risks.  It may or may
not, depending upon the support which the host government is
willing to provide, seek commercial insurance covering business
interruption, interruption in cash flows and similar risks.  In
this connection, there are several new forms of insurance which
have been developed by the London insurance  market which might be
- 28 -useful for BOT projects.4/  One is  a "funding" policy to cover
cash flow shortfalls mainly in the pre-completion phase of a
project.  The other is a more traditional cost overrun insurance
policy specifically adopted for BOT projects.
4.6  Uninsurable Risks (Force  Maleure).  Some risks (usually
force maL.-re risks) are either not insurable at all, or not
insurable at a reasonable cost.  Commercial lenders and export
credit agencies will normally be reluctant to assume the force
majeure risks in a BOT context and will seek to have support pro-
vided by one or more of the other parties.  Equity investors  may
assume the force maieure risks for themselves but normally will
not be willing to protect the lenders against force maieure.  The
lenders, therefore, will normally insist that the host government
provide some coverage for uninsurable force maleure events.
4.7  Political Risk.  Both foreign commercial lenders and
foreign equity investors in BOT projects will normally seek
political risk insurance, either from their own export credit
agencies or from such sources as the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency.  Political risk insurance  will normally in'lude
coverage for any breach by the host government of specific under-
takings provided to the BOT project.
4.8  Commercial Risk Insurance.  The United Kingdom's Export
Credits Guarantee Department ("ECGD")  recently announced a new
optional addition to its traditional insurance for political
risks.  ECGD will now insure, in certain cases, up to 60% of the
commercial risk of approved projects.  As of early June 1989,
however, cf some 80 proposals received, only one had proceeded to
4/  See South, "New Insurance Approaches to the Pre- and Post-
Completion Risks in BOT Projects," in Legal Studies & Services
Limited, The Second International  Construction Projects Confer-
ence:  Documentation (London,  June 5 and 6, 1989).
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the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation also have the
authority to provide commercial guarantees up to certain limits.
It is not clear, however, to what extent such coverage will
alleviate the need for host government support in the typical BOT
context, since the export credit agencies will want their own
assurances  from  host governments.  For instance, it  was the U.S.
Eximbank  which insisted  on having the Government of Turkey pro-
vide for standby subordinated loans to the Gazi power plant
project as a condition of Eximbank's proposed financing and
guarantees.
V.  NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR  FEASIBLE  BOT PROJECTS
5.1  Legal Environment.  The legal structure of a typical
BOT project is complicated.  This suggests that only developing
countries with a fairly  mature legal system will easily accommo-
date the BOT approach.  The laws and regulations under which the
BOT project operat  .must be readily ascertainable and must be
compatible with the project's private nature.  Private ownership
of the particular type of infrastructure facility (power  plant,
toll road, telecommunications  network)  must be allowed by local
law.
Private sponsors and lenders  will want assurances that the
basic contractual comrititments  to the BOT project both from the
host government and from other private parties will be respected
and can be enforced.  In some instances,  the reliability  of the
host country's own legal system may provide some of these assur-
ances.  Nevertheless, the essential contract documents --  both
with the host government and among the other parties --  will
almost always provide for international arbitration in a neutral
jurisdiction and will specify a governing law which is familiar
- 30 -and acceptable to the private sector participants.  This may or
may not be the law of the host country.  Alternatively, special
legislation  may be sought to resolve specific issues  which are
not otherwise adequately covered by existing law.
5.2  Economic Environment.  A BOT project will normally call
for some proportion of local lenders and local  equity investors.
Finding such lenders  anid  investors  will  be  easier in  a count-y
which has a developed banking system and some sort of organized
financial  market.  The fact that such markets exist to some
degree in Thailand, Malaysia and Pakistan, for instance, appears
to make it possible to attract equity from local sources for ROT
projects in those countries.
Most BOT projects will derive their revenues from outputs
priced in local currency which must often be used to pay for
imported raw materials or fuel, as well as for debt service and
equity reimbursement.  Such projects will be more easily launched
in an economic environment free of excessive inflation or unduly
rapid exchange rate movements.  Even if the host government is
willing to protect investors in the project against both infla-
tion and currency risk, it will be far easier to find mechanisms
to do so in a relatively stable economic environment than in a
highly unstable one.
5.3  Host Country Credit Rating.  The BOT formula by no
means eliminates consideration of the host country's overall
creditworthiness  as a major factor in the decision of both pri-
vate and public lenders to finance a project in a particular
country.  The more host government support and guarantees are
needed to make a project viable, the more lenders will be looking
to the credit of the host country as well as to the project for
eventual repayment.  In the case of commercial lenders, and their
respective export guarantee agencies, loans to a BOT project in a
- 31 -particular country still count as loans to that country for pur-
poses of exposure limits.  For some countries, these limits may
be exhausted, so that a particular lender or agency would not be
willing to finance  or guarantee any further projects in that
country, whether or .aot  a BOT formula is used.
Developing countries which still have a relatively strong
credit rating --  for instance countries like Thailand and
Ma:aysia --  seem to have a better chance of developing BOT
projects than countries whose credit is not regarded as being so
strong.  Countries with intermediate  credit ratings --  such as
Indonesia,  Turkey, Pakistan, Mexico, Chile and the
Philippines-/  --  may still be sufficiently highly rated to make
BOT projects possible.  Countries whose credit rating is regarded
as being lower than those cited are less likely to be able to
attract BOT projects until their rating improves.
In some countries, special factors  may favor BOT approaches.
For instance,  the Philippines may benefit from a politically
motivated desire on the part of some capital exporting countries
to help the new democracy there.  China seems to have benefited
in the past from the willingness of commercial lenders to take
rather unusual risks in order to enter a new market of enormous
long term potential.  Mexico and Brazil may be able to take
advantage  of the availz,bility  of substantial amounts of existing
sovereign debt which can be "swapped" into new BOT projects.
5.4  Political Environment.  Another necessary pre-condition
for the successful implementation  of BOT projects (which  may
already be taken into account in the country's credit rating) is
the host country's political stability.  Without political
5/  This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely
illustrative,  and of course is subject to change.
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a BOT project may not be possible.  Even if  promised, the promise
would probably not be credible.  Private sponsors will not be
willing to spend the substantial amourts of ti'me  and money
required to put a BOT project together, and then remain at risk
for the 10 to 25 year periods which are typically required, if
they cannot count on political stability and continuity over such
period.
5.5  Sector Characteristics.  In theory, the BOT formula
could be applied to any sector of the economy.  All that i..
required is that there be an assured source of revenue over the
proposed project life.  The revenue can come either from a
government-owned  purchaser (e.g., the government power authority
in the case of a power plant), from commercial end users (e.g.,
airlines in the case of an airport, shipping companies in the
-ase  of a port facility)  or from individual consumers (e.g.,
drivers on a toll road, subway riders, retail customers for water
distribution).  Part, or even all, of the proposed revenue could
also come from direct government payments.  For instance, if the
government wanted to have an expressway built, without incurring
what some observers have criticized as the inefficient burden of
tolling, it could agree to pay for the expressway over time
according to some formula based on road traffic.
The history of BOT projects to date, some of which is
briefly sketched in  Annex 2 to this report, indicates that the
greatest interest in  BOT projects has been in the power sector
and in toll roads.  Nevertheless, a number of other types of BOT
projects have been implemented  or are being seriously negotiated,
including  port facilities, airports, free trade zones, bridges,
tunnels,  metro systems, and water treatment plants and supply
systems.
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projects in the early 1980s came from the general downturn in
international  construction  work.  Major contractors found them-
selves with large staffs and a dearth of projects.  They were
willing, therefore, in that particular economic environment, to
spend considerable time and money in an effort to develop and
promote projects.  Furthermore, they agreed to become equity
investors in those projects contrary to their prior practice.
There does not seem to be the same impetus today for this
kind of involvement.  A number of major U.S. engineering firms,
for instance,  have restructured their operations since the early
1980s, cutting their work force to less than one-fourth, at the
low point, of their size when business was at its height.  Busi-
ness has now begun to pick up again, and U.S. firms are expand-
ing.  In the power sector in  particular, but also in civil engi-
neering generally, these firms see ample work in the immediate
future in  developed countries.  As a result, they will probably
be less willing than they were several years ago to put up with
the complexities  and risks of BOT projects in developing
countries.
Whether the view of U.S. firms is shared around the world is
not clear.  It  may be, for instance, that Japanese firms will
still be as interested in BOT projects as previously.  But the
upturn in the business cycle for international  construction work
generally may be a significant constraint on BOT projects in the
near term.
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One of the key questions for host governments and for their
financial advisers, such as the World Bank, is whether the over-
all cost of a BOT project is higher than that of a project
financed  directly by sovereign borrowings and, if so, whether
such higher cost is nevertheless reasonable in order to implement
projects which could not otherwise be funded because of fiscal or
budgetary restraints.  If BOT projects cost more, the host gov-
ernment, or its  citizens, will end up paying this higher cost one
way or another:  through a higher power tariff, higher tolls or
water charges, a longer concession period or a greater sharing of
revenues from existing assets.  A full response to this question
would require access to detailed financial information which is
not publicly available.  We understand that the World Bank plans
to do a separate study of this question.  The following observa-
tions are offered as a guide to issues  which might be covered in
such a study.
6.1  Cost of Senior Debt.  On the senior debt side, a BOT
project company's cost of borrowing could be expected to be
slightly higher than a host government's cost of sovereign bor-
rowing  would be, since the creditworthiness of a sovereign bor-
rower should, in theory, command a lower interest rate.  To the
degree that commercial lenders can obtain the support of govern-
ment export credit guarantee agencies, however, the cost of
senior non-recourse borrowings in BOT projects may not be that
different from the cost of sovereign loans.  Moreover, because of
the equity component of a BOT project, there may be less senior
debt overall than there would be sovereign borrowings in a
project directly financed by the government.
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will clearly be more expensive than long term sovereign debt.6 1
To compensate for the substantial project risk which equity
investors  will normally be taking, they will insist on a higher
return  than that sought by senior lenders.  The host government
does get some consideration for this higher cost, however.  It
gets the insurance benefit which the equity cushion provides to
cover cost overruns during construction and operation.  It also
gets the technical benefit of the investors' long term commitment
to the project.
The information  we have been able to gather as to projected
returns  on equity in BOT projects is set forth in Table 2 on the
next page.  As the table indicates, BOT projects will often pro-
vide a system of up-side rewards and down-side penalties to
equity investors, depending upon whether or not the project
meets, exceeds or falls short of its projections.  In BOT power
projects in Pakistan, for instance, the Government has indicated
a willingness to consider proposals which project an 18% return
on equity at a plant utilization factor of 60-65%.  If utiliza-
tion increases to 75%,  the rate of return to the equity investors
would increase accordingly.  The cost of power to the government
in the latter  case would also decrease significantly, so that
both parties benefit.  The risk/reward system negotiated for the
Turkish Gazi project was reported to be much less attractive.
Not only was the 16% base case return considered by one partici-
pant to be low to begin with, but apparently there were serious
6/  BOT projects often have a layer of subordinated debt.  This
will be more expensive than the senior debt, but should be less
expensive than equity.
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rewards for exceeding projected performance.7/
An overall cost comparison between the BOT approach and a
sovereign debt financing would have to take into account the
potential effect of these adjustments.  It should also put some
monetary value on the "insurance" aspect provided by having
equity investors or subordinated lenders in a BOT project, which
would not be present in a sovereign debt financed project.
Table 2
REPORTED EQUITY RETURNS IN BOT PROJECTS
Projected
Information  Return
Proiect  Source  on Equity
Pakistani Power  Presentation of Mohammad  18%
Projects  Akram Khan, Advisor, Minis-
try of Water and Power, Gov-
ernment of Pakistan, London
BOT Conference, June 1989
Gazi Power Plant,  Stevenson, "The Turkish BOT  16%
Turkey  Power Project Experience,"
May 1989
Labuan Water Supply  Remarks of Mohamad Hanafiah  18%-20%
Project, Malaysia  Omar, London BOT Conference,
June 1989
Bangkok Second Stage  BECL, Presentation to Inves-  3%-21%8/
Expressway  tors, September 1988
7/  See Stevenson, "The Turkish BOT Power Project Experience,"
May, 1989.
8/  These are figures for the base case assumptions.  The 3%
return is for the first 10 years; it becomes 21% over the 31 year
life of the concession.
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are more expensive or less expensive to host governments than
traditionally financed ones, one would have to consider the over-
all cost of the project rather than simply comparing rates of
return on debt and equity.  Proponents of BOT projects contend
that the long term equity commitment required of SOT sponsors, as
well as their control over design, construction and operation,
will normally lead to significant cost efficiencies over what a
comparable project, designed, built and operated by a public
authority, would cost.  Some government officials might contest
this view.  A definite answer to this question may have to wait
until more experience is gained from successfully completed BOT
projects.
6.4  Other Benefits.  The analysis of the overall cost of a
BOT project should also consider other potential benefits to the
host country.  The BOT approach may provide greater training ben-
efits and more continuous transfer of technology (particularly,
for example, in the case of a power plant project) than would be
true for a government owned project.  The private planning,
development and management of the BOT project by the project com-
pany may save the host government considerable development, over-
head and management costs which would be incurred if the govern-
ment were fully responsible for the project.  Finally, proponents
of "privatization"  believe that the private sector management and
operation of an infrastructure facility over the life of the con-
cession period will yield additional benefits not immediately
measurable in cost savings --  e.g., in  quality of services ren-
dered, environmental protection, and modernization.
6.5  BOT vs. BOO.  There is some question as to whether the
"transfer" feature of a BOT scheme is necessary to meet a host
country's objectives or whether in some cases a BOO (build,  own
- 38 -and operate) approach might not be preferable.  The Philippines
has recently asked that proposals for power plants be submitted
in the alternative, as both a BOT project and a BOO project.  A
proposal on the latter basis might be significantly cheaper for
the host government over the initial  period, since the sponsors
would in theory have "forever" to recoup their investment and to
earn a reasonable return.  Most private investors, however, do
not give much weight to returns which are 15 to 20 years away.
The typical BOT sponsors, therefore, may well want nearly the
same total return over the first 20 years of a BOO project as
they-would want from a BOT project.  In that case, there would
not be any substantial savings to the host government from a BOO
approach.
Moreover, as just noted, under the BOT approach host govern-
ments should benefit from the training and technology transfer
which are implicit in the fact that the project must be trans-
ferred to government control at-the end of the concession period,
and the government should, therefore, have included in its agree-
ment with the project company provisions to assure that it will
have sufficiently trained personnel and access to technology to
carry on the project thereafter.  These benefits might be lacking
in a BOO project.  On the other hand, a BOO scheme might provide
more incentive  for the owners to maintain and refurbish the plant
or other installation  during the concession period, thereby sav-
ing the host government from having to take on that responsibil-
ity at the end of the project.  Both in the case of training and
technology transfer and in the case of maintenance and refurbish-
ing, of course, the host government may be able to protect its
interests  sufficiently by contract, regardless of the form of the
investment.
Finally, in the case of the BOT project, it would still be
possible for the host government to negotiate an operating and
- 39 -maintenance agreement with the project company after the initial
concession period.  Negotiating a new agreement for continued
operations should be cheaper for the host government than merely
extending the concession period, since there would no longer be
any need for debt service or compensation to equity investors.
VII.  PROCUREMENT  ISSUES
As has been noted, developing and negotiating a BOT project
is complex, time consuming and costly.  Sponsors can be expected
to spend the years of time and millions of dollars requi:ed only
if the process for awarding projects is reasonably orderly and
the chances for success, and thus the recovery of their initial
investment, are predictable.
7.1  Unsolicited Proposals.  Given the large amounts of
money typically involved in a BOT project and the substantial
measure of government support needed, it  may be politically dan-
gerous, as well as unwise as a matter of economic policy, for a
host government to accept unsolicited  proposals from a single
sponsor without any evaluation or review of competitive alterna-
tives.  In a sector such as the generation of electric power or
the construction of toll roads, however, such proposals can some-
times be evaluated on the basis of whether or not the proposed
cost of power or highway construction is lower than the cost in
similar government owned projects.  Occasionally the cost might
also be measured against the cost of existing BOT projects which
themselves were selected by competitive bidding.  Having such an
external yardstick may be sufficient protection for the host gov-
ernment to obviate the requirement  of competitive bidding in a
particular case.  In general, however, some form of initial com-
petitive selection is probably preferable.
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BOT projects should be similar to that for awarding public works
projects.  Ideally, a host government would itself identify the
projects it wished to do on a BOT basis rather than simply
responding to proposals.  The government would define the project
specifications, the level and nature of government support to be
given, the proposed method for calculating the power tariff,
tolls or whatever the source of revenue for the project is to be,
the debt/equity ratio required and other parameters for the
transaction.  The government would then invite preliminary pro-
posals.  A preliminary winner would be selected on the basis of
normal competitive criteria (price,  experience and track record
of sponsors, side benefits for the host country, etc.).  A letter
of intent  would be signed with the preliminary winner, and nego-
tiations would proceed to finalize the financing and the various
agreements among the parties.
As indicated above, tne sponsors of a BOT project will nor-
mally include a principal engineering and construction contrac-
tor, one or more major equipment suppliers, and a party willing
and able to take on the operating and maintenance responsibility
of the project.9/  Their only reason for being sponsors and
equity investors is to be able to provide services and equipment
to the project.  It is not realistic, therefore, to require a
sponsor consortium, once tentatively selected to do a BOT
project, to use international  competitive  bidding for the goods
and services which the consortium members wish to provide.
Use of a preliminary award and then further negotiations
pursuant to a letter  of intent  should make it possible for
9/  The operator does not have to be part of the sponsoring con-
sortium.  On the other hand, the operator may in some instances
be the same as, or an affiliate of, the principal contractor or
one of the equipment suppliers.
- 41  -potential sponsors to limit their expenses in the pre-letter of
intent  stage, when their chances of winning the project are
highly uncertain.  Once the letter of intent is issued, they can
then commit the substantial additional time and resources needed
for detailed feasibility studies and final negotiations with
lenders, equity investors, suppliers, contractors and the host
government with a reasonable degree of confidence that their
project will go forward and that their investment can be
recovered.
7.3  Integrity  of the Process.  There will always be some
tension between the need to preserve the integrity  of the compet-
itive bidding process and a host government's  desire to get the
best possible price for any given project.  The latter desire
might lead a host government to continue to shop initial  bids
until it is certain that it has achieved the best possible price.
If, however, a government becomes known for allowing upset bids
to be made after initial  bids are submitted, it is likely to find
the initial  bids on subsequent projects starting out much too
high, as well as finding that some potential bidders will no
longer  want to participate in a bidding process that will lack
credibility.  The Turkish government may have fallen into this
trap in its negotiations for major coal fired power plant
projects.  (See  Annexes 2 and 3.)
VIII.  ARGUMENTS  FOR AND AGAINST BOT PROJECTS
Although this report  does not come to any final judgment as
to whether or not BOT projects should be encouraged, there are a
number of arguments which can be made in favor of the BOT
approach and at least two fundamental arguments against it.
8.1  Additionality.  An  argument often heard in favor of the
BOT approach is that it is supposed to provide significant
- 42 -"additionality.1  In cases in  which a host government has neither
the budgetary resources nor the borrowing capacity to finance an
infrastructure  project as a public sector project, the BOT for-
mula, according to this argument, offers the possibility of real-
izing a project which would otherwise not get built.  Financing
"additionality" is provided in the form of the sponsor's equity
investment,  as well as, in  many cases, passive equity and subor-
dinated debt.  In  some cases, commercial banks may be willing to
lend to a BOT project with a specifically tailored security pack-
age where they might not be willing to make new loans to the gov-
ernment itself.  Governments which are actively promoting the BOT
approach, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia and the Philippines,
have cited this "additionality" factor as a principal reason for
their interest.
The contrary argument is that commercial lenders  and export
credit guarantee agencies will be constrained by the same country
risk limits,  whether or not the BOT approach is used.  Moreover,
the high level of host government support which is required for a
BOT project may displace other projects.
8.2  Credibilicv.  A second argument in favor of the BOT
approach is the credibility it provides.  The willingness of
equity investors  and lenders to take on the risks associated with
a BOT project and to make a long term commitment to the project
are seen as practical indications  that the project is considered
to be viable by knowledgeable experts.  A number of observers
believe that the private sector will be better able to evaluate
whether and how a particular project should be built than the
public sector.  The BOT approach, therefore, should save develop-
ing countries from "white elephant" projects which might other-
wise be carried out as public sector projects.  This benefit
might be lost, however, if so much government support for a BOT
project is  provided that the sponsors bear no real risk.
- 43  -8.3  Efficiencies.  A third argument often cited in favor of
BOT projects, which may be only a corollary of the second, is
that the private sponsors' control of and continuing economic
interest in the design, construction and operation of the project
will produce significant cost efficiencies  which will benefit the
host country.
8.4  Benchmark.  A number of government commentators have
mentioned the usefulness to the host government of having a pri-
vate sector project to use as a benchmark to measure the effi-
ciency  of similar public sector projects in the same country.
8.5  Technology Transfer and Training.  The continued direct
involvement  of the private sector sponsors in a BOT project over
the life of the concession period may promote a more continuous
transfer of technology from the contractor, equipment suppliers
and operator to the project company, and hence to the host gov-
ernment, than would be likely in a public sector project.  A BOT
project would normally also include a strong training program, so
as  to leave a fully trained local staff in place at the end of
the concession period.  Such training could, of course, take
place without a BOT project, but the BOT scheme provides a con-
text in  which the presence of the foreign  sponsors may facilitate
such training.
8.6  Privatization.  Finally, if one of the political and
economic goals of a host government is to  move its local economy
as much as possible into the private sector, a BOT project will
have obvious appeal  over a project finea2ced  by public sector bor-
rowings  and owned and operated Ly host government bureaucracies.
8.7  Complication and Cost.  The case against BOT projects
rests primarily on two points, one incontrovertible,  and the sec-
ond open to discussion.  It is incontrovertible  that BOT projects
- 44 -are highly complicated  undertakings.  They take money, time,
patience and sophistication to negotiate and bring to  fruition.
The history of the Turkish negotiations for a major coal fired
power plant, which is  described in some detail in Annex 2 to this
report, suggests that, from a host country's point of view, the
lost opportunity costs of such a time consuming process are
severe.  If a developing country has the budgetary resources or
borrowing capacity to do a project as a publicly financed
project, therefore, it  may be advisable to do so just for this
factor alone.  Likewise from a prospective sponsor's point of
view, getting involved in the promotion of a BOT project must
still be seen as a highly risky endeavor.
The second  point often raised against BOT projects is that
their overall cost to host governments is greater than a tradi-
tional public sector project.  This point is contested by propo-
nents of BOT's, who argue that the overall costs are in fact less
when design and operating efficiencies are taken into account and
the full cost of public sector alternatives is measured.
IX.  WORLD BANK GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN BOT PROJECTS TO DATE
The history of the World Bank Group's involvement in BOT
projects to date can be briefly stated as follows.
9.1  World Bank.  The World Bank, by its charter, is limited
in its lending activities to making loans to sovereign govern-
ments or loans that are covered by a sovereign guarantee.  Thus,
it has not been able to lend directly to BOT projects, none of
which so far has carried a sovereign guarantee.  The World Bank
has found indirect  and creative ways, however, to assist its mem-
ber countries in implementing  BOT projects.
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in establishing  a US$520 million Private Sector Energy Develop-
ment Fund (the "PSEDF"), which is intended to make long term
loans to finance up to 30% of the cost of qualifying projects,
including  BOT projects, in the energy sector.  In the Philip-
pines, an energy sector loan from the World Bank is intended to
be used by the Philippines government and its government agencies
in  part to fund investments  or standby facilities for BOT
projects.
Another way in which the Worli Bank helps its member coun-
tries carry out BOT projects is  by conducting sector studies.
These studies have been done for the power sector in  Turkey,
Pakistan and the Philippines.  They have helped to identify the
need for and to  determine the feasibility of BOT power plant
projects in these countries.
In addition, the World Bank is currently studying various
measures under the general heading of "Expanded Cofinancing Oper-
ations" which might be used to facilitate BOT projects.  These
measures include  providing World Bank guarantees for commercial
bank loans and local bond issues.
9.2  IFC Involvement.  Although IFC has apparently consid-
ered participating in a number of BOT projects, as of early Octo-
ber 1989 it had still not committed to any.  IFC can support BOT
projects at three  different levels.  It can invest  equity, pro-
vide direct loans and underwrite or syndicate commercial bank
loans.  It cai.  also perform studies for host governments on the
need for various  projects.  Finally, it can act as a paid finan-
c. l adviser to host governments.  Some of the projects which IFC
has reportedly been considering are referred to in  Annex 2.
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The foregoing discussion should make clear that there are a
number  of areas in which the Bank and IFC, if they wish to
encourage BOT projects in the developing world, can provide sig-
nificant assistance to host governments.  The World Bank's newest
affiliate, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA")
may also play a role in this area.
10.1 Education.  First, given the complexity of most BOT
projects and the sophisticated legal and financial concepts
involved,  the Bank or IFC could help to explain to host govern-
ments what a BOr project is, its possible advantages and disad-
vantages and the kinds of government support that may be needed.
10.2 Advisers.  If a host government decides to pursue one
or more BOT projects actively, we believe it is essential that
the government hire early in the process a qualified financial
adviser and experienced legal counsel to advise and represent the
government in both the selection process and in negotiations with
potential sponsors.  An outside technical adviser, with experi-
ence in the sector involved (e.g.,  power plants, roads, airports,
subways, etc.) should also be added to the government team.  The
Bank or IFC should encourage host governments to make use of such
advisers, could provide lists of recommended advisers and may be
able to provide funding to pay for them.
10.3 Identification of Prolects.  The Bank can be of signif-
icant help to developing countries in analyzing their needs for
infrastructure  projects and sorting out priorities.  The Bank can
perform (or finance) sector studies and feasibility studies and
help host governments identify specific projects to meet their
general needs.  If the decision is  made to attempt to do a
- 47 -project on a BOT basis, the Bank or IFC can advise the host gov-
ernment as to how to frame the request for proposals.
10.4 Evaluation of Proposals.  Given the Bank's extensive
experience  with large construction projects generally, and the
growing experience of both the Bank and IFC with BOT projects,
each can play an important role in counseling and advising host
governments  during the negotiating process.  As their familiarity
with BOT projects grows, both the Bank and IFC can help by offer-
ing tested  solutions to recurring issues.
10.5 Establishment of Local Regulatory and Financial Infra-
structure.  As indicated above, BOT projects are more likely to
be feasible in environments which have a legal and regulatory
framework favoring private foreign investment.  The Bank can be
helpful in focusing the attention of host governments on these
issues.  It  may be able to provide funding for Lhe host govern-
ments to enlist outside advisers in shaping such programs.
BOT projects also seem more likely to be successful in
developing countries which have a reasonably strong local banking
network and established local financial markets.  The ability to
tap local private investors in Thailand, Malaysia and Pakistan
seems to have facilitated the implementation of BOT projects in
those countries.  The Bank's current efforts to strengthen those
sectors in  developing countries generally may, therefore, be of
particular benefit to future BOT projects.
10.6 Direct Involvement.  Both the Bank and IFC should also
be able to play direct roles in BOT projects by providing or
arranging necessary financing.  IFC, as noted earlier, can invest
directly in the equity of a BOT project company, can lend
directly to such a company and can put together a syndicated loan
from commercial banks.  The Bank, although restricted by its
- 48  -charter to sovereign lending, can still play a leading role in
providing financing for BOT projects.  The PSEDF in Pakistan and
the energy sector loan in the Philippines have already been cited
as examples of significant Bank contributions.  With or without a
fund of this nature, the Bank may provide direct loans to host
governments to participate in the financing of a BOT project.
The Bank might also provide a standby line of credit to a host
government to back up the latter's contingent commitments to BOT
projects.  Other possibilities may exist under the "Expanded
Cofinancing Operations" currently being developed.
The Bank could lend directly to BOT projects if the host
government would provide a sovereign guarantee.  As this report
has attempted to show, in the case of infrastructure  projects in
developing countries, there is no such thing as a "pure" BOT
project without extensive host government support.  A false sense
of doctrinal purity, therefore, should not prevent host govern-
ments from examining this possibility.
10.7 MIGA.  The purpose of MIGA, the newest member of the
World Bank Group, is to encourage foreign investment in  develop-
ing countries by offering political risk insurance.  This insur-
ance protects foreign investors against occurrences such as
adverse changes in exchange control laws; expropriation; war,
revolution or civil disturbance; and repudiation or breach of
contract by the host government.  Forms of foreign investment
that can be covered by this insurance include equity, loans and
loan guarantees.
There are certain limitations,  however.  Although MIGA can
insure  up to 90% of the investment amount, it is subject to a
per-project, per-coverage limit currently set at US$50 million.
This limit may be too low to be of much use in the typical BOT
infrastructure  project.  Also, the duration of a contract
- 49  _guarantee will typically be for a maximum term of 15 years,
although occasionally the term may be extended to up to 20 years.
Many BOT projects run for longer than 20 years.
In addition to its guarantee program, MIGA is apparently
prepared to provide advisory services to developing member coun-
tries to improve their attractiveness to foreign investment.
This program is designed to support and reinforce the guarantee
program.  MIGA's participation in a BOT project through these
interrelated  programs might enhance confidence that an investor's
rights  will be respected by a host country.
XI.  CONCLUSION
The BOT formula for infrastructure projects in  developing
countries is by no means a panacea.  BOT projects are exceedingly
complex from both a financial and a legal point of view.  They
require an extended period of time to develop and negotiate.  If
the same project can be implemented in a more traditional  way --
i.e., with a turnkey construction contract financed by sovereign
borrowings --  the time savings, together with the greater cer-
tainty of having the project go forward,  may warrant pursuing the
traditional approach.
If, however, a country is not able, or for budgetary or pol-
icy reasons prefers not, to finance all of its needed infrastruc-
ture on the basis of budgetary resources or sovereign borrowings,
the BOT approach is an option to be considered.  In the right
context, it appears to be workable.  Moreover, as the basic
structure of BOT projects becomes better understood, and as stan-
dard solutions to the various issues posed become more accepted
by host governments and in the marketplace, BOT projects should
become somewhat easier to negotiate and implement.
- 50  -A BOT project appears to provide some "additionality" in
tapping sources of private sector financing which otherwise might
not be available.  The sponsors' commitment of substantial equity
to a project assures that they will also remain committed to the
project's successful operation over the concession period.  Their
"at risk' investment provides a strong incentive to have the
project perform above its minimum expectations.  Likewise, having
the design, implementation and operation of a BOT project largely
in the hands of the private sector may provide economies and
efficiencies that will balance out or even outweigh the higher
financing costs of non sovereign borrowing and equity investment.
A host government which wishes to promote BOT projects, how-
ever, must understand and be willing to accept the complexity and
time consuming nature of the process, the extensive host govern-
ment support which will have to be provided, and the rates of
return which commercial lenders and private sector equity inves-
tors will expect.  With that being understood, the BOT approach
appears to be a useful possible alternative to the conventional
financing and operation of infrastructure  projects in developing
countries.
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BOT  INFRASTRUCTURE  PROJECTS
IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
REPORTED  IN THE  PRESS:
A  PARTIAL  LIST
COUNTRY  PROJECT  STATUS
China  Sharjiao  coal-fired  power  Operating
station  in Guangdong
Huaneng  power  project  Unknown
Superhighway  project  Unknown
Costa  Rica  Road  maintenance  outside  Unknown
San  Jose
Cote  d'Ivoire  Water  distribution  Operating
Gabon  Manganese  Ore  Terminal  Proposed
Indonesia  Toll  roads  Unknown
Nuclear  power  plants  In  negotiation
Malaysia  North  Kelang  Straits  Bypass  Operating
(toll  road)
Kepong  Interchange  (toll  road)  Operating
Labuan  water  supply  pipeline  Operating
and  treatment  plant
Labuan-Beaufort  submarine  Under  construction
electric  cable
Kuala  Lumpur  Interchanges  Under  construction
North  South  Highway  Under  construction
Oman  Manah  gas  turbine  power  plant  Proposed
Pakistan  Hab  River  power  plant  Contracts  signed
Fauji  Foundation  power  plant  Letter  of  Intent
Habibullah-Siemens  Letter  of  Intent
Consortiun.  power  plant
Philippines  Metro-Manila  power  plant  Under  construction
International  container  (Hopewell)
terminal  Proposed
Construction  and  operation  of  Proposed
private  commercial  ports
300  MW  coal  fired  power  plant  Request  for
proposals  issuedCOUNTRY  PROJECT  STATUS
Singapore  Mass Rapid Transit  Unknown
Thailand  Bangkok Second Stage  Under construction
Expressway
Bangkok Metro  In negotiation
Turkey  Akkuyu nuclear power plant  Abandoned
1000 MW coal fired power  Contracts signed
plant
Additional coal fired  Proposed
power plants
Hydro power plants  Under construc-
tion(?)
Bosphorus Second Bridge  Under
construction
(non BOT)
Bosphorus Third Bridge  Abandoned
Bosphorus tunnel  Proposed
Istanbul Airport  In negotiation
High-speed rail  -link  between  Proposed
Istanbul and Ankara
Water plant  (Izmir)  Abandoned
Ankara Metro  Proposed
Toll roads  Proposed
Port facilities and free  Proposed
trade zones
-2-ANNEX  2
REVIEW OF SELECTED MAJOR BOT PROJECTS
In spite of the considerable interest  which the BOT formula
has aroused in recent years, and the fairly substantial number of
specific BOT infrastructure  projects which have been proposed,
and in some cases extensively negotiated, there seem to be rela-
tively few such projects in developing countries which have man-
aged to get to financial close and to have entered the construc-
tion phase, let alone being successfully completed.  To revie'
all of the BOT projects which have been proposed would be an
impossible task because of the lack of reliab'e information pub-
licly available.  This annex, however, will review briefly the
history of BOT projects in some of the countries which have been
most interested in promoting the BOT formula.
China
One early BOT project, which was started in 1984 and has
been operating successfully since 1987, involves a 700 MW coal
fired power plant at Sharjiao in  Guangdong Province, China.  This
project was built by a consortium led by the Hopewell Group of
Hong Kong and largely financed by a syndicate of commercial banks
put together by Citicorp.  A Chinese government agency agreed to
supply coal at a fixed price for the entire concession period and
to purchase electricity up to 60% of design capacity for the same
period.
China has been reported to be contemplating a number of
other BOT projects, but our information is sketchy as to which
are actually going forward.  One factor which seems to have
helped the Sharjiao project was the willingness of commercial
banks to accept substantially greater credit risks than is normal
in this type of project finance, presumably because of a desire
to make a political gesture toward the PRC, and perhaps in an
effort to gain entry into a new market with enormous potential.
These factors are nct normally present and may no longer be true
even for China.  This initial  Chinese BOT project, therefore, is
not regarded by commercial bankers as a model to be followed
elsewhere.
Turkey
One of the first countries to conceive of the BOT approach
to traditional infrastructure investments  was Turkey.  In the
late 1970s, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Turgut
Ozal, and his younger brother Yussuf Ozal, a former employee of
the World Bank and then head of Turkey's State Development Orga-
nization, Turkey sought to have a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant at
Akkuyu built on a BOT basis at a cost of some US$652 million.  A
-3-joint venture utility (the "JVU"), comprised of the contractor
and the government-owned  Turkish electric authority ("TEK"), was
to finance, build, own and operate the plant for 15 years.  Dur-
ing that period, TEK would purchase the plant's generated elec-
tricity from the JVU at fixed prices.  At the end of the 15
years, the plant was to be turned  over to the Turkish government.
Despite years of protracted negotiations between the Turkish
government and the principal bidders for the project, Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited and Kraftwerk Union of West Germany,
this project was never implemented.  Apparently the parties were
unable to reach agreement on a satisfactory distribution of
risks.  On the one hand, the  Turkish government took the position
that under the BOT formula the government should not have to pro-
vide a sovereign repayment guarantee for the external debt to be
taken on by the JVU, a guarantee for the purchase of a minimum
amount of electricity, or exchange rate or convertibility guaran-
tees which the project sponsors and lenders were seeking.  On the
other hand, in the absence of these guarantees from the Turkish
government, neither the West German nor the Canadian export
credit  guarantee agency was willing to provide its  guarantees for
the sponsors' proposed investments  or the contemplated export
credits.  Thus neither the sponsors nor the commercial lenders
were willing to proceed.
Although the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project was never
implemented,  the Turkish government, as well as individual  munic-
ipal governments in Turkey, continued to seek other BOT projects.
These included a number of coal fired power plants (discussed in
more detail below), the building of a 1.6 mile road tunnel under
the Bosporus, several port facility and free trade zone projects,
a proposed expansion of the Istanbul airport, a high-speed rail
link between Istanbul and Ankara, the development of a metro rail
system for Ankara, a second and third bridge over the Bosporus, a
number of small hydroelectric power stations and the construction
of various toll roads.
Information is  sketchy as to how many of these projects are
going forward.I0/  In the past, numerous agreements have been
announced with respect to projects which have then fallen apart.
Exemplary in this regard is the history of Turkey's attempt to
obtain one or more large (+1,000  MW) coal fired thermal power
plants.  The history begins at least as early as September 1984
when the Turkish government asked the Bechtel group to carry out
a pre-feasibility study for  a 600 to 1,000 MW plant to be
financed and built on a BOT basis.  Bechtel's pre-feasibility
10/  Attached to this Report as Annex 3 is a note prepared by
Jean-Jacques Lecat of Bureau Francis Lefebvre which provides
additional details about many of these projects.
-4-study was positive.  Bechtel was then asked by the government to
present a forrmal  proposal.  The proposal was submitted in Septem-
ber 1985.  It called for a US1l billion, 960 MW plant to be built
at Tekirdag on the Sea of Marmara west of  stanbul.  -he Bechtel
consortium included Combustion Engineering of the United States,
which was to suppljy  the steam generator plant, and Kraftwerk
Uniorn  whiiclh  vias  to  supply the turbine generator sets.
The  pro:ject  contemplated  the  formation  of  a  private  Turkish
company  to se owned  730  by  the  various  sponsors  (U.S.,  German  and
Japanesei and 30% .v TEK,  the  Turkish  government  owned  utility.
TEK would aqree to purchase eectric>-tv from the  project  company
on a take or nav oasis over tne life of the projecr.  -he power
tariff  was  et-.c1ci  t.  ,e  su2f  icient  under  "base case"  perfor-
mance assumpvionis  to oav off the projec  debt  and Lo  provide a
reasonable ieturn on the equitv.  According to  Bechte-'s pro-
posai,  tne power  tarif7  was  expected  to  yield  a "base case"
internal rare  of return to  the equitv investors of 20%'  per annum.
It  also  provided  some  upside  poienc-ial  for better than "base
case" perfornldnce,  some protectiorn  for ni.qher  than anticipated
inflation and some relief in the case of force majeure events.
A  key  feature  of  the  power  tariff was  that TEK agreed to
make  its  paymen,s  in  a  basket  of  currencies  in  proportion  to  the
currencies  required  for  the  debt  service  payments  due  to  lenders
and the projected returns to  the equity investors.  This feature,
although hiqhlv cormplex  to work out in practice, dealt effec-
tively with several major concerns which are typicallv present in
a BOT project, namely foreign currency convertibility and
exchange rate risk.  The Turkish government also agreed to pro-
vide a sovereign guarantee of TEK's obligations and certain tra-
ditional foreign investment incentives,  most notably relieving
the project company of any obligation to  pay Turkish corporate
income tax.
An impasse  was reached, however, between the Turkish govern-
ment and the United States Eximbank.  The government, in line
with its  view of the BOT concept and the stance it had taken in
the Akkuyu projecr,  did not want to provide any payment guaran-
tees to cover the project debt.  Eximbank wanted an unconditional
sovereign guarantee for its large proposed loan to the project
company.  Negotiations between the government and Eximbank over
this issue dragged on over 18 months.  During this period, the
government was approached by other sponsor groups, which were
then encouraged to  submit alternative proposals for other sites
in the same size and cost range as the Bechtel proposal.  The
Turkish government apparently hoped that other export credit
agencies would be more flexible than Eximbank and would agree to
take some of the project risk, thereby putting pressure on
Eximbank to do the same.
-5In  January 1987, in the Bechtel negotiations, a compromise
was finally reached on the loan security issue.  The Turkish gov-
ernnient  agreed that if revenues generated by the power off-take
agreement were not sufficient to service the project debt at any
time until the project became fully operational (defined as three
years of successful operation), the government would make subor-
dinated loans to the project company to cover the shortfall.
Eximbank accepted this compromise as functionally equivalent to  a
sovereign guarantee.
With this major issue resolved, the Turkish government
announced it  wanted to proceed with three coal fired plants and
invited  proposals from six different sponsor groups.  In Septem-
ber 1987 the government ranked the various bidders based on the
estimated power tariffs under each proposal.  The first ranked
group, which would be entitled to be the first project to pro-
ceed, was a consortium led by Seapac Control Services Pty. Ltd.
of Australia.  It included a major Japanese contractor, Japanese
and U.S. equipment suppliers, and the Queensland, Australia gov-
ernment which was to supply the coal for the project.  The pro-
posed plant, to  be built at Gazi, also on the Sea of Marmara, was
slightly larger (3 x 350 MW) than the plant proposed by Bechtel.
Its configuration  had a major advantage over Bechtel's, in that
it  could still meet its minimum output projections even with one
unit partially down, whereas Bechtel's 2-unit configuration prob-
ably could not.  The projected cost was US$1.4 billion.  The
equity investors,  who were to finance about 20% of the project,
were the Turkish government, for about one third of the equity,
and Seapac, the Queensland government, TEK, the Japanese group
(Chiyoda,  Marubeni-Hitachi,  Mitsui-Toshiba and Tokyo Electric-
Tepsco), Westinghouse, IFC and others for the balance.  The debt
financing was to come from, among other sources, U.S. Eximbank,
Japanese Eximbank, various Australian sources, commercial lenders
(with export credit guaranties) and IFC.
The government of Queensland, however, soon withdrew its
support, and Chiyoda and Westinghouse took over the leadership of
the consortium.  The Turkish government spent the first half of
1988 going through round-robin  negotiations with the other spon-
sor groups, playing one off against the other, apparently in an
attempt to get the lowest  possible power tariff.  In the course
of these negotiations, the return to the equity investors under
the "base case" performance assumption was cut to 16%, with vir-
tually no upside for better performance, but severe penalties for
failing to meet the base case.  Moreover, protection for higher
than expected inflation, relief to the equity investors for force
maieure events or delays, and the ability to recoup losses in the
early years by better performance in later years all disappeared
from the deal.
-6-At the end of this process, in August 1988, the Turkish gov-
ernment returned to exclusive negotiations with the consortium
now led by Chiyoda and Westinghouse.  The total project cost had
been reduced to US$1.3 billion and there had been some changes in
the ranks of both the lenders and the equity investors.  The
Chiyoda consortium apparently had continued to meet or beat the
concessions offered by the other sponsor groups.  Bechtel at this
point withdrew from further negotiations.  By June 1989, the
Chiyoda consortium had reportedly reached final agreement with
the government on all points.  Financial close for the Gazi
project was expected between July and September.
A month later,  however, the Gazi project had been put on
hold by the Turkish government.  In late October, the government
announced that it had signed an agreement in principle with one
of the other competing sponsor groups, a Japanese consortium led
by Electric Power Development Corporation, for a $1.3 billion MW
coal fired power plant at Aliaga.
The tortured negotiating history described above suggests
that the BOT approach has not been a wholly satisfactory solution
to Turkey's power needs.  Even if the Aliaga project is able to
reach financial close and to start construction by April 1990, as
currently proposed, the scheduled completion of the plant is not
until sometime in 1993, nearly ten years from the government's
original request to Bechtel for a pre-feasibility study.  Yet the
World Bank had determined in a 1985 study that Turkey would have
to add a 1,000  MW plant each year for ten years, starting in
1990, to keep up with the expected growth in  demand for electric
power.  Even if the Aliaga project now goes forward on schedule,
therefore, the lost opportunity cost of failing to come to an.
agreement much earlier with one or another of the bidders may far
outweigh the potential savings which the Turkish government may
realize from having negotiated a lower power tariff.
Other BOT projects in Turkey have also had a troubled his-
tory.  For the Ankara metro project, for instance, a consortium
led by Canada's Urban Transit Development Corporation ("UTDC")
was originally selected more than three years ago.  Later the
agreement with UTDC was abandoned and Turkey began negotiating
with a consortium led by Bouygues, of France, only to announce in
October of this year that a new agreement had been signed with
UTDC.  Negotiations over the Istanbul airport expansion project
have apparently been going on for several years with the private
parties feeling they are getting nowhere.  As one news report put
it recently, "many foreign negotiators are getting tired of
receiving a green light from one ministry, a yellow from a second
and then encountering a roadblock from the lower echelons of the
state bureaucracy."  Engineering News Record, Vol. 223, No.19,
p.51, November 9, 1989.
-7-Malaysia
In contrast to Turkey, Malaysia over the course of the last
several years has actually completed construction of three BOT
projects and has three others under construction, although only
one is comparable in size to the Turkish projects.  Those com-
pleted are two toll road projects --  the North Kelang Straits
Bypass at a cost of US$20.5 million and the Kepong Interchange at
a cost of US$86 million --  and a project involving a water treat-
ment plant and a submarine pipeline to the island  of Labuan at a
cost of US$126.5 million.  The Labuan-Beaufort Interconnection,
involving laying a submarine cable for electricity, at a cost of
US$80 million, is  under construction.  Two more toll road
projects, the Kuala Lumpur interchanges (expected to cost US$300
million) and the remaining unbuilt portion of the North-South
Expressway (expected to cost a further US$3.5 billion), are also
being implemented.
Although Malaysia's BOT experience, therefore, seems to have
been positive, outside observers have raised a number of criti-
cisms of the major project, the North South Expressway.  It has
been suggested, for instance, that the government's initial
reluctance to provide a reasonable "security package" d-ierred
truly private sponsors from bidding on the project.  e eventual
sponsor was a firm largely owned by certain officials  the
Malaysian government.  The firm did not have a proven track
record or strong financial standing.  In the end, the Malaysian
government did provide an extensive security package, including
governmenr loans, traffic volume guarantees, exchange rate guar-
antees, anid  guarantees against various events of force maieure or
government action.
Thailand
Thailand is reported to be close to completing a major BOT
infrastructure  project, the building of a 30 kilometer toll road
outside Bangkok, known as the Second Stage Expressway, which  is
to be operated by a private company.  This 25 billion baht (US$1
billion) project is based on a toll concession which is expected
to run for 30 years beginning on March 1, 1990.  The project is
under the direction of the Expressway Rapid Transit Authority of
Thailand ("ETA").  ETA is a state enterprise formed in 1972 for
the primary purpose of implementing tolled expressways and mass
transit systems in  Thailand.
The financing, building and operation of the Second Stage
Expressway has been given to the Bangkok Expressway Company, Lim-
ited ("BECL"), a company incorporated in Thailand and majority
owned (approximately  2/3) by Kumagai Gumi Company, Limited, a
major Japanese engineering and contracting firm.  The remaining
equity ownership is expected to be spread among various Thai
-8-institutional investors and some international financial institu-
tions.  IFC and the Asian Development Bank were invited to par-
ticipate.  At a later stage, once the project becomes opera-
tional, BECL intends to sell shares to the public, partly new
shares and partly a sale of Kumagai Gumi's existinq
shareholdings, reducing the latter to approximately 309%  of the
equity.
Compared to the time which has been taken to  negotiate the
various Turkish BOT projects referred to above, the negotiations
in  Thailand have been fairly rapid.  In February 1988, BECL and
Kumagai Gumi formed a consortium known as Bangkok Expressway Con-
sortium ("BEC") to prepare, submit and negotiate 'if selected by
ETA) the terT.¶s  under which BECL might be awarded the project.  It
is not clear whether this was an unsolicited proposal or a
response to a request issued by ETA.  In April, BEC was invited
by ETA to begin negotiations.  In late July, BEC/BECL was advised
that ETA would recommend to tie Thai Cabinet that BECL be awarded
the project, subject to the execution of a binding agreement.  On
September 20, 1988, the Cabinet approved the award of the project
to BECL, subject to final approval of the agreement by the appro-
priate government department.
In order to finance the estimated 25 billion baht (US $1
billion) necess--y to build the project, according to a September
1988 "Presentation to Investors," BECL was attempting to get 5
billion baht ($200 million) of equity subscription commitments
and 20 billion baht ($800 million) of committed senior debt with
recourse solely to BECL and its assets.  The loans were expected
to come primarily from commercial banks in Thailand and frcm
multilateral and bilateral governmental lending institutions.  In
addition to offering BECL's assets as security to lenders for
repayment of their loans, a bond pool containing performance
bonds guaranteeing the obligations of the trade contractors under
the major trade contracts was to be established.
The Thai government has taken a number of steps to facili-
tate the implementation of this project.  First, it agreed to
share with BECL, according to a revenue sharing formula, revenues
from the existing government built toll road system.  It issued a
decree enabling ETA to acquire the land necessary for the build-
ing of the new expressway and caused the expressway concession to
be placed on the eligible list for investment privileges.  Such
privileges include an eight year corporate income  tax relief
period, commencing from the first date that revenue is earned,
and tax exemptions on dividends.
The government has also provided that, in the event of
"exceptional occurrences," BECL would be entitled to  delay the
implementation  schedule and would also have recouirse  to certain
other remedies.  Such remedies include one or more of thefollowing:  an adjustment in the revenue sharing proportions; an
increase in tolls on the system; an extension of the duration of
the revenue allocation percentage then in effect; and an exten-
sion of the overall concession period of the project.  The
"exceptional circumstances" which could lead to such reatet'ies
include  miterial increases in interest rates, material economic
dislocation in  Thailand, -material  delays in the relocation or
diversion of utilities, government action or inaction (including
undue interference  with the execution of the project), unantici-
pated adverse ground conditions, significant disruptions in the
local construction and building materials industry, and non-
i.surable events of force  majeure.
Thailand has also been negotiating with a conisortium  led by
Canada's Lavalin for the constructioII,  on a BOtT  hasis, of "Stage
O..e,  Phase One" of the Banclkok  metro, at a cost of Can USS2 bil-
lion (US$1.6  billion).  Lavalin has assembled a sponisor  group led
by Lavaiir.  International (its international  marketr'pg  and  financ-
ing subsidiary) and the Urban Transit Development Corporation
(another  subsidiary which designs and builds railway rolling
stock).  The consortium includes  Mitsubishi Corporation,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, a group of Thai companies, and
financial backers Morgan, Grenfell and Thai Farmers Bank.
According to press reports, competition for this project was
stiff between Lava in, a group called the Asian European Consor-
tium and the Sanko Japanese consortium.  In the end Lavalin won,
reportedly because it offered a more balanced package of technol-
ogy, operating systems and finance.  The relative cost of the
package does not seem to  have been the deciding factor.
The Thai government is committed to take at least 25% of the
total equiry wnen final figures are determined.  It is  estimated
that this 25% will amount to around 10.5 billion Waht (US$416
million).  The shortfall is to be made up by foreign investors.
Approximately 50% to 60% of the cost of the project will be for
imports.  They will be partly financed by 23.6 billion baht
(US$934  million) worth of mixed credits, mainly from Canada, with
a  smaller credit from Japan.  It was initially  hoped that a final
agreement could be reached in the summer of 1989, and that "Stage
One, Phase One" of the metro would be in  operation by 1994.
Pakistan
Pakistan signed the basic contracts for its first major BOT
project, the Hab River project, on December 23, 1989, and is
actively seeking others as part of its overall policy to encour-
age private investment in the power sector.  Pakistani officials,
moreover, have outlined in  various published statements orderly
guidelines for evaluating and negotiating BOT projects.  The gov-
ernment of Pakistan recognizes that it  may wish to deal not only
with competitive bids, in response to a request for propcsals
- 1 i¶:sinitiated  by the government, but also with unsolicited proposals
from the private sector.  It has developed a methodology for
dealing with both kinds of proposals.
Competitive bids are invited  only after feasibility studies
have been conducted by the Pakistan  Water and Power Development
Authority ("WAPDA')  or Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, the
site of the power plant is known, the type and size of the plant
has been determined and all other parameters, including the cost
of the equipment, have also been generally determined.  The gov-
ernment will evaluate all bids submitted and settle upon a
project sponsor based primarily upon the lowest proposed power
tariff.  Other factors will also be considered, however, such as
the overall conformity of the bid to the specifications in the
tender  documents and overall capital costs, financing charges and
costs of operation and maintenance.  The impact  of these other
factors on such issues as foreign exchange requirements  or possi-
ble escalation in the power tariff over the life of the project
is to be taken into account.  Once the sponsor is picked, the
government will issue a letter of intent, and the sponsor then
will have a certain period of time to carry out its  own feasibil-
ity studies, to obtain the necessary financing, and to negotiate
and finalize the various contractual  documents leading to finan-
cial close and the start of construction.
In the case of unsolicited proposals, the private party must
carry out its own feasibility study, select its own site and
determine the type, size and fuel for the proposed plant.  Ini-
tial permission to carry out a feasibility  study must, nonethe-
less, be obtained from the government.  The government will then
review the proposal to determine the appropriate power tariff,
based on the government's understanding  of the costs of the pro-
posed equipment in the international  market, standard construc-
tion costs, fuel costs, financing costs, operations and mainte-
nance costs, and a projected 18% return  on equity at a Jevel of
plant availability between 60% and 65% of designed capacity.  The
government will insist  on full disclosure of all of the cost data
and thus on full transparency  of the tariff.  The government also
has as a benchmark its own cost of power.  It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that the government has recognized the need to provide a
realistic return on equity at an availability level which is suf-
ficiently low to provide considerable  downside protection as well
as significant upside potential for better performance.  When all
of these details have been negotiated with the Ministry of Water
and Power, the proposal will be formally  submitted to the govern-
ment for approval.  If approved, a letter of intent  will be
issued and the project will proceed to finalization.
The government of Pakistan has indicated that BOT projects
in the energy sector normally should be financed 25% by equity
and 75% by debt.  Although both the equity and the debt portions
-11-are expected to have a foreign and a local component, the govern-
ment has not set any fixed ratio between the two.  Local financ-
ing has proved to be something of a problem in Pakistan.  Local
banks are reluctant to extend loans for the purpose of such
projects, local financial markets are not as well developed as
they might be, and the government is still in the process of
seeking satisfactory  methods of tapping the resources that are
available both locally and from Pakistanis living  outside
Pakistan.
The World Bank has played an important role in  private sec-
tor energy development in Pakistan.  With support from the World
Bank and other donors, a Private Sector Energy Development Fund
(the "PSEDF") has been set up under the control of Pakistan's
National Development Finance Corporation to be used to finance up
to 30% of private sector energy projects.  The in.itial  funding
amounts to US$520 million, of which US$146 million has been pro-
vided by the Bank, and the remainder by the Japanese Export-
Import  Bank, the U.K. Overseas Development Agency, the Government
of Italy and USAID.  All loans to the PSEDF are guaranteed by the
government of Pakistan.  Loans made by the PSEDF to BOT projects
may be subordinated to loans provided by :ommercial lenders.  The
commercial lenders, in that case, would be financing only about
45% of the total cost of the project and would be senior in right
of payment to both the PSEDF, which would be financing up to 30%
of  the total, and the equity investors, financing about 25%.
Pakistan's first major BOT project involves a 1,300 MW oil
fired power plant to be sited near the mouth of the Hab River, in
Baluchistan province, about 40 kilometers from Karachi.  The
sponsoring consortium is led by Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering
of Great Britain and Xenel Industries  of Saudi Arabia.  The total
Hab River project is currently estimated to cost some US$1.1 bil-
lion to US$1.3 billion.  (Press reports of the precise figures
are conflicting.)
In addition to the Hab River project, Pakistan has issued
letters  of intent  to the Fauji Foundation for a 300 MW oil fired,
steam driven power plant, and to a Habibullah Mines (Pakistan)-
Siemens (Germany)  consortium for two coal-fired steam stations
totaling 130 MW.  It is also considering a number of proposals
for smaller oil fired and coal fired plants.
Philippines
The Philippines  has recently experienced rapid growth in
energy demand, indicating  an immediate  need for the expansion of
energy supply capabilities, particularly power generating capac-
ity.  To assist the Philippine government in addressing its
energy problems, the World Bank carried out an energy sector
study in 1988 and has proposed a US$350 million loan to help
-12-finance the first phase of a new development strategy for the
Philippines energy sector.  One of the components of this strat-
egy is the encouragement  of private sector participation through
joint ventures and BOT schemes.  For instance, it is intended
that proceeds of the World Bank loan could be used by the Philip-
pines National Oil Company and the National Power Corporation
(the "NPC") to meet cash calls on these agencies in joint ven-
tures with the private sector, e.g., BOT schemes.
A number of BOT projects have been proposed in the Philip-
pines.  One of the first to be implemented involves the develop-
ment of a 200 megawatt gas turbine power plant in  Metro Manila.
This plant, which was initially  estimated to cost about US$42
million, is expected to be used primarily as a standby facility
for "peak load"  purposes.  The project sponsor is Hopewell Hold-
ings  Limited of Hong Kong.  An implementing  agreement was entered
into  with the NPC in  mid-November 1988.  The Asian Development
Bank and IFC were both initially  slated to provide debt and
equity for the  project.  Equity was also to be provided by
Hopewell and Citicorp.  Apparently IFC decided not to participate
in this project in the end, and its precise status at the present
time is not known, although it is reported to be going forward.
All of the electricity produced by the plant was to be sold
under 'take-or-pay" terms to the NPC.  The NPC was to pay both a
fixed monthly capacity fee for a contracted capacity of 200 mega-
watts, regardless of usage, together with an additional energy
fee based on the actual amount of electricity generated.  Total
fee revenue would be used to pay operating expenses, taxes, debt
service, and dividends.  The NPC was to provide free fuel and
free use of the project site for the entire contract period.
On the issue of risk sharing, the sponsors insisted that
under the take-or-pay contract, part of the capacity and energy
fees be paid in  U.S. dollars into an offshore account in Hong
Kong.  The sponsors also insisted  that the Philippine government
provide a performance undertaking to back up the NPC's payment
obligations under the agreement.  Although the Philippine govern-
ment was at first unwilling to provide anvthing more than a com-
fort letter assuring payment and foreign exchange convertibility,
in the end the formal commitments sought by the sponsors were
reportedly provided.
The Hopewell project apparently was the result of an
unsolicited  proposal and was not the subject of competitive bid-
ding.  In March 1989, however, the NPC issued a solicitation to
pre-qualify potential bidders to undertake a 300 megawatt
coal-fired power plant on BOT terms.  According to the NPC, some
35 companies requested copies of the solicitation, and some 14
were eventually pre-qualified:  five Japanese, four European,
three American and one each from Australia and Hong Kong.  The
-13-official request for proposals was issued on November 5, 1989.
The NPC wants to have the plant operational by 1993.  It appears
that the government does not plan to provide any guarantees to
cover lenders for project risk due to sponsor failure or force
maieure events.  This may become a stumbling block in the Philip-
pines, since experience in  other countries suggests that foreign
lenders and export credit agencies may not be willing to finance
BOT projects in the absence of a security package which essen-
tially insulates the senior lenders from project risk.
One question which has been raised by at least one potential
bidder with respect to the Philippines' proposal relates to the
specifications of the coal to be supplied by the NPC to the
project.  The proposal requires that the boiler and its auxiliary
equipment be designed to handle both local and imported coals
with specified typical analyses ranging from a best case to worst
case scenario.  Such vagueness forces the BOT sponsor to design a
plant based on the worst case scenario, rather than being able to
design for a specific grade of coal, the supply of which would be
assured by tle sponsors.  This will considerably increase the
cost of the plant.  A question has also been raised as to what
remedies the project company and its lenders will have if the
fuel specifications are not met, or if delivery is interrupted.
The Philippine government has provided a set of standard
foreign investment incentives  and guarantees to potential spon-
sors.  Sponsors will be registered with the Board of Investments
and will be entitled to the privileges and incentives given by
the government under Section 74, Republic Act No. 265 and the
Omnibus Investment  Code of 1987.  These incentives include:
--  the right  of foreign  investors  to remit  earnings  from
and to repatriate the entire proceeds of the liquida-
tion of foreign investments in the currency in which
the investments  were made and at the prevailing
exchange rate at the time of remittance or
repatriation;
--  the  right of investors  to remit,  at the prevailing
exchange rate at the time of remittance, such sums as
are required for the payment of interest and principal
on foreign loans and obligations;
--  a guarantee  by the Philippine  government  that property
of the BOT firm will not be expropriated by the govern-
ment except for public use or in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of just
compensation;
--  a full exemption  from  income  taxes  levied  by the
Philippine government for four to six years from
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commercial operations, with yearly extensions allowable
under certain specified cases;
certain provisions for the additional deduction of
labor expenses;
certain tax and duty exemptions on imported capital
equipment;
simplifications of customs procedures;
exemptions from certain taxes on contractors; and
other similar incentives.
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AN  OVERVIEW  OF BOT  PROJECTS  PROPOSED  IN  TURKEY
Jean-7acques  Lecat  2
I.  The  Turkish  Government's  Aniroach  to  the  BOT  Model
The  government  that  took  office  follow'.ng  the  1983.elections,
headed by Prime Minister  Turgut  OZAL, launched  a privatization
initiative  which  included  the  implementation  or  transfer  of  new  and
existing  projects  to the  private  sector  through  BOT  schemes. The
use  of  the  BOT  model,  originally  proposed  for  the  construction  and
operation  of  a nuclear  power  plant,  was considered  in  1986  by the
government  for the implementation  of more than twenty  projects
including:
transport  infrastructures  (Ankara  to Istanbul  highway and
other highway sections, as  well  as  port  and  airport
facilities);
free  trade  zones  to  be  built  at  Antalya  and  Izmir;  and
power  plants  including  hydroelectrical  projects  and  coal  fired
stations.
In  addition  to  projects  initiated  by the  government,  several
city  councils,  e.g.  in  Istanbul,  Ankara,  and Izmir,  sought to
promote  their  projects  under  the  BOT  model  following  proposals  from
private investors,  sometimes  without the necessary government
support.
I  This  note was  prepared  at  the  request of  the World  Bank's Legal Department  as a
contribution  to  the report  on "The  Suild,  Operate  and Transfer (BOT)  Approach  to
infrastructure  Projects in DeveLoping  Countries"  prepared  for  the World  Bank  by Mark
Augerblick  and  Scott  Custer  of  the  Law  firm  of  Shaw, Pittman,  Potts  and  Trowbridge
(Washington  D.C.), Jawary 1990.
2  Jean-Jacques  Lecat is  in charge  of  the international department  of  the Law  firm
Bureau  Francis  Lefebvre  (Paris,  France).  Pierre  GuisLain  and  Zoe  Kolovou  of  the  Legal
Department's  Private  Sector Developm  nt  Advisory  Group  (World  GBnk)  contributed to
this  note.
-16-The main terms and conditions  of the BOT model have been
established under  the  supervision of  the  Foreign Investment
Directorate  (FID)  of  the  State  Planning  Organization  (SPO)  which  is
in  charge  of approving  foreign  investments  in  Turkey. The  terms  of
the  agreements  are negotiated  with the  authority  Ain  charge  of the
relevant  economic  sector  and  have  to  be approved  by the  FID  and  the
Undersecretary  of Treasury  and Foreign  Trade of the Ministry  of
Finance  with  respect  to financial  and  foreign  exchange  conditions.
In 1987, the Turkish Government  set forth the principles
governing  the implementation  of projects  under the  BOT  model in a
note distributed  to  potential  investors,  which  read  as follows 3:
"An  Approach  to  Self-financing  of the  Infrastructural  Projects:
Built-Own-Transfer  (B.O.T.)  Model
To bring  in  new and advanced  technology  and  good  management
and  to  realize  some  of the  infrastructure  projects  which  are  needed,
but kept outside  of budget  outlays  due to macro balances  of the
economy,  the  present  Turkish  Government  which took  office  towards
the  end  of 1983,  have  opened  such  projects  to  private  sector  within
the  framework  of Built-Own-Transfer  (B.O.T.)  Model.  Some of the
hydraulic  dams,  power  plants,  airports,  trade  centers,  free-trade
zones, metros, port projects, railways, etc. are  under  this
classification.
The  relevant  agreements  to  implement  some  of the  hydraulic  dam
and power plant projects  and a free-trade  zone project  via said
model  have been signed  already  between  the  Ministrv  concerned  and
3  The  text  in  square brackets  and the footnotes  were added  by the editor  of  this  paper.
-1  7-consortlum acquiring the project.  And  negotiations for  the
Implementation  of some  other  projects  are  continuing.
The  principles  of "Build-Own-Transfer"  Model are summarized
below:
1.  A  Joint  Venture Company  (JVC) shall  design, engineer,
construct,  finance,  own,  manage  and  maintain  the  project.
2.  Debt/Equity  ratio  should  not  be  less 4 than  80/20.
3.  The  Republic  through  an  appropriate  entity  will  be  willing  to
invest  up to  30X  of the  equity  in  JVC to  be  formed  to  acquire
and  operate  the  projec.
4.  All  financing  of  the  project  (other  than  the  equity)  will  be
arranged  by  the  sponsors  but  will  be  the  obligations  of  JVC.
S.  JVC is  obliged  to  complete  the  project  under  a turnkey  fixed
price  contract. However  the  liability  of the  contractors  for
failure to complete  the  project  will be joint and several
towards  JVC.
6.  Construction  cost overruns other than force majeure and
Republic  default  events  shall  be borne  by JVC.
7.  In the event that the project  has not been completed  on
schedule  or any Interruption  during  the  operation,  JVC shall
utilize the following secondary funds for  debt service
obligations.
4  One  may  wonder  whether the  intent  was not  to  say  "shouLd  not  be higher  than 80/20".
-1  8-(a)  Standby  financing  obtaLned  by  JVC  at  least  co  cover  12
month  debt  service.
(b)  Any liquldated  damages  avaLlable  from the contractors
and/or  suppliers.
(c)  Any  available  insurance  proceeds.
(d)  Reserve  fund  during  the  operation  at leasc  to cover  12
month  debt  service.
(e)  Subordinated  loans  made by the Republic  to  cover  12
month  debt  service.
8.  The Republic through  an appropriate  entity shall purchase
products  and/or  services  produced  by  JVC  based  upon  annually
agreed amount.  Treasury will guarantee the Purchaser's
payments  under  Sales  Agreement.
9.  The  terms and conditions  of purchase of products  and/or
services  will  be set  In  Sales  Agreement.
10.  The tariff  will be calculated  based upon the  agreed  annual
amount of the products  and/or services  produced from the
project.
11.  The tariff  will be composed  of capltal charge, operating
charge  and dividend  and shall  be payable In the  particular
currencies  [in]  which  the  project  [was]  financed:
(a)  The  capital  charge  is the  basis  on  which  JVC's  lenders
will be  providing  the  senior  debt;
(b)  The  operating charges will  cover  operation and
administration  costs including  insurance  costs and a
maintenance  reserve;
-19-(c)  Dlvidend  wll  be  payments  that  include  return  on equity
sufficient  to  provide  an Internal  rate  of return  of the
JVC's  equity  adequate  to  attract  lnvestors.
12.  The  equity  shall  be  repatriated  after  all  senlor  debt  has  been
repaid 5 ..
13.  When  senlor  debt  has been  repaid  and  equity  capital  has  been
repatriated  the  plant  may be transfered  to the  Republlc  or,
If  mutually  agreed  by the  parties,  JVC  may  operate  the  plant
for  another  set  period."
II.  Overview  of Prooosed  BOT  Proiects
Only  a  partial  overview  of the  progress  made  in  some  of  these
projects  may  be given  due  to the  incomplete  information  available:
1.  Transport  Infrastructure:  The  construction  of toll  roads  on
a  BOT  basis  has  not  attracted  the  established  construction  companies
and the  Government  has not received  any serious  offers  for such
projects.
The  second bridge over the  Bosporus was  awarded to  a
consortium  led  by  a  Japanese  contractor  under  a  regular  public
investment  contract  rather  than  on a BOT  basis.  A consortium  led
by  the  UK contractor  Trafalgar  House  proposed  to  the  Istanbul  City
Council  the  construction  of  a  third  bridge  under  the  BOT  model;  this
unsolicited  proposal  was not accepted,  as the  Government  was not
convinced  of the  need to build a third  bridge  over the  Bosporus,
regardless  of the  financing  scheme.
5  One my  wonder  ihether  the  intent  was  not  to  write:  uThe  equity  shaet not  be
repatriated before att  senior debt has been  repaid.
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from  three  French  contractors  (Bouygues, Socidt6  Generale
d'Entreprise  SGE, and Dumez) for a  tunnel  under th! Bosporus.
However, the project did not receive the necessary government
support,  in particular,  with respect  to the  -guarantees  which  were
sought  from  the  Istanbul  City  Council. Furthermore,  the  mayor  who
had initiated  the  project  was  not  reelected  in 1988.
The  Istanbul Airport  extension project  included  the
construction  and  management  by a privately  owned  company  of a new
terminal  and world trade center (30,000  hectares);  the existing
facilities  would  be contributed  by DHMI (the  public  authority  in
charge  of  civil  aviation). Airport  taxes  and  fees  would  be paid  by
the  airlines  to  the  operating  company  in  foreign  currency. Even  the
Turkish  Airline  (THY),  would  pay  a  portion  of  these  taxes  in  foreign
currency. Several  US companies  and a French  company  bid for  this
project. Lockheed  Corporation  was  ranked  first. Other  bidders  have
complained  that  only the  cost of construction  of the terminal  was
taken  into  account  in  the  bid  evaluation,  without  due  consideration
for:  (i)  criteria  pertaining  to the  operation  of  the  terminal  after
the  completion  of  the  construction  phase;  and  (ii)  the  construction
cost of the World Trade Center (WTC).  The combination  of the
airport terminal  and world trade center  projects  under one BOT
contract  is  a major  reason  for  the  delays  in concluding  this  deal.
It  appears  to  be a  way  for  the  Government  to  entice  a  consortion  to
build  and  operate  the  WTC,  which  by itself  would  probably  not  be a
viable project.  this could hold up the terminal  construction
unnecessarily.
The Turkish  Government  proposed  the construction  of a metro
in  Ankara  using  the  roT  model  although  the  city  council  was  not so
enthusiastic  to have a privately  rianaged  metro.  Considering  the
-21-high cost  of infrastructure,  the  project  was  divided  in two  parts,
as is common  in  many railway  construction  projects  in Europe:  (i)
heavy  infrastructure  financed  by the  state  and  operated  by a joint
venture  with  private  majority  interest  and (ii)  equipment  financed
by the  private  shareholders.  The  feasibillty  study  was  financed  on
C3nadian  concessional  funds provided  by CIDA and was done by a
Canadian  firm.  The Canadian  firm  Bombardier  was the first  ranked
bidder.
2.  Water  Supoly: In  the  Water  Supply  sector,  foreign  contractors
proposed  the building  and operation  of a water treatment  plant,
within the framework  of a project for the rehabilitation  and
extension  of the piped  water supply  system  of the city of Izmir
financed  in  part  by a  World  Bank  loan. The  operating  company  would
have included private  foreign  and  Turkish  partners  and  would  have
sold  water  in  bulk to the  city  councils  of the  region. According
to  our  information  this  project  has  not  been  implemented  due  to  lack
of support  by the  governmental  authorities  and the  uncertainty  of
the  legal  framework,  as  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  city  council  has
the right to contract  out water supply services  to a  private
company.
3.  Electricity  SuRnly: In the area  of Electricity  Supply,  the
construction  and  operation  of various  types  of  power  stations  have
been  under  discussion  for  several  years. Originally,  the  BOT  model
was proposed for the construction  and operation  of a 1,000 mw
nuclear  power  plant  of  an estimated  cost  of $652  million  at  Akkuyu;
a joint venture utility (the "JVUW")  consisting  of 70% private
interests  and  the  government-owned  Turkish  electric  authority  (TEK)
would finance,  build, own and operate the plant for 15 years.
During that period  TEK would purchase the plant's generated
electricity  from  the  JVU at fixed  prices. The Turkish  Government
and the  main bidders  selected  for negotiations,  Atomic  Energy  of
-22-Canada  Ltd.  and  Kraftwerk  Union,  never  reached  a  final  agreement  and
the  project  was not implemented. The  main points  of disagreement
among  the  parties  related  to  the  distribution  of  risks:  the  Turkish
Government was  not  willing  to  provide a  security package
satisfactory  to the export credit  agencies  of West Germany and
Canada.  Without such.  guarantees,  the banks involved in  the
financing  could  not  pro-vide  the  required  export  credits.
In May 1987, an agreement  was  signed  between T'X and a
consortium  comprising  Kumagai  Gumi of Japan  and  Yukabel  Insaat,  a
local  company,  for  the  building  and  operation  of a 300  mw dam and
hydroelectrical  power  station  at  Yedigoze  on the  river  Seyhan,  near
Adama,  for  an estimated  cost of $231.5  million. A proposal  for a
hydroelectric  project to be built at Yamula in central  Anatolia
under the BOT model was, according to our information,  never
implemented.
4.  Coal  Fired  Power  Stations: Coal  fired  power  station  projects
involved  a  large  number  of  foreign  firms  invited  to  submit  proposals
under a competitive  bidding  procedure;  some reached  the stage  of
advanced  negotiations  with  the  Turkish  authorities.  The  lengthy  and
intermittent  discussions  which  have  taken  place  during  the  last  five
years  have led  to  some  changes  in  the  policy  originally  established
by the Government  and to the elaboration  of complex  arrangements
which  are  summarized  in the  following  section.
The  history  of these  projects  starts  in 1984,  with the  pre-
feasibility  study carried  out by Bechtel  at the request  of the
Turkish  Government  for  a 600  to 1,000  mw coal  fired  electric  plant
that  was to  be financed  and  built  on the  BOT  model.  In September
1985,  on the  basis  of the  positive  results  of this  study,  Bechtel
submitted  an offer  for  a 960  mw plant  to be built  X  Tekirdag,  on
the  sea  of  Marmara,  at  a  cost  of  about  $1  billion;  to  carry  out  this
-23-project  Bechtal  formed  a  consortium  including  Combustion
Engineering,  a  US manufacturer  of steam  generators,  and the  German
company  Kraftwerk  Union  (KMU).
During  the  negotiations  with  Bechtel,  which  started  at  the  end
of  1985,  the  basic conditions  which  were then  used  by the  Turkish
Government  to  establish  the  terms  of  reference  for  similar  projects
were  negotiated. In  the  meant,we,  other  consortia  made  proposals
for coal fired  plants  at other  sites.  At the end of February
1987,  the  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Natural  resources  sent  a  letter  to
the five consortia that had made proposals defining the most
important  criteria  for the evaluation  and selection  of the best
offer  as  well  as  the  security  package  granted  by the  government  (see
Attachment  to  this  note). Propostis  were  submitted  by the  following
consortia,  each consortium  bidding for a project  at a  different
site: (i) Bechtel (USA) and KWU (West  Germany)  for a plant in
Tekirdag;  (ii)  Seapac  (Australia),  Chiyoda  (Japan)  and  Westinghouse
(USA)  for  a  plant  in  Yummurtalik,  near  Gazi;  (iii)  Asea  Brown  Bovery
(Sweden/Switzerland)  for a plant on the sea of Marmara;  (iv)
Electric  Power Development  Corporation  (Japan) for a  plant at
Aliaga;  and (v)  Alsthom (France)  and Ansaldo (Italy)  for  a plant
tear  Izmir.  The bidders  were ranked  in September  1987,  and the
Turkish  authorities  declared  that  three  plants  would  be  built  in  the
following  eighteen  months.
The first  ranked  bidder  was the  Seapac-Chiyoda-Westinghouse
consortium  wh:.  benefitted  from the support of the Queensland
(Australia)  Government  with  respect  to  equity  funds  and  coal  supply.
Contractual  documents  were initialled  by the  parties in December
1987.  The Government  of Queensland  however,  soon withdrew its
support,  and Chiyoda  and  Westinghouse  took  ver the  leadership  of
the  consortium.  The  Turkish  Government  spent  the  first  h-alf  of 1988
negotiating  with  all  of the  sponsor  groups  in  turn,  but  returned  in
-24-i  August  1988 to exclusive  negotiations  with the consortium  now led
by Chiyoda  and  Westinghouse.  By  June 1989,  members  of the  Chiyoda
consortium  claimed they had  reached final agreement with the
government  on all  points. A month  later  however,  the  Gazi  project
had  reportedly  been  put  on  hold  by the  Turkish  Government.  In  late
Occober,  the  Government  announced  that it  had signed  an agreement
in principle  with one of the  other  competing  sponsor  groups,  the
Japanese  consortium  led  by Electric  Power  Development  Corporation,
for  a $950  million  coal  fired  power  plant  at  Aliaga. This  project
now  appears  to  be held  up on environmental  grounds.
Legislation  is  being  submitted  to the  Turkish  Parliament  for
the  ceation  of an Energy  Fund.  This Fund would serve,  amongst
other  purposes,  as a vehicle  for financing  the  various  guarantees
offered  by the  Government  for  BOT  projects  in  the  energy  sector.
-II. Main  Conditions  Drovided  for  the  imnlementation  of coal  fired
gower  groiects
The  main  conditions and  guarantees provided  for  the
construction  and operation  of the coal fired power plants are
described  below,  as they stem from the  documents  prepared  by the
Turkish authorities and  some  of  the  contractual provisions
negotiated  by the  consortia.  These  provisions  are  contained  in the
fullowing  main agreements  required  for  the  implementation  of a BOT
project:
(i)  A  Protocol between the Turkish Government and  the
consortium  establishing the  key  principles  and
undertakings  between  the  parties;
(ii) An Implementation  Agreement  between  the  Consortium,  the
operating  company  to be formed  (the  Project  Company),
-25-and  the  Turkish  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Natural  Resources
(MENR) which  forms  the  basis  for  the  construction  and
operation  of  the  Project;
(iii)  An Energy  Purchase  Agreement  between  TEK and  the  Project
Company whereby TEK  is  irrevocably committed to
purchasing  available  electric  power on a take or pay
basis;
(iv) A  Construction  Contract  between  the  Project  Company  and
the  main  contractors;
(v)  A  Subordinated  Loan Agreement between  the  Project
Company  and the  "Public  Participation  and  Mass  Housing
Fund'  (the  Fund);
(vi) An Eecrow  Agreement  between  TEK, the  Project  Company,
the  Fund,  the  co-lenders  to the  Project  and the  escrow
agent.
As  a first  step,  once  all  the  above  agreements  would  have  beer
negotiated  and  signed,  the  Turkish  Government  would  issue  a  Decree
approved  by the Council.  of Ministers  confirming  its obligations
under  these  agreements.
1.  Energy  Purchase  Agreement:  The  Purchase  Agreement  irrevocably
commits  TEK  to  purchase  from  the  Project  Company  any  and  all  amounts
of energy  made avai' 1 able.  In some  proposals  a minimum  guaranteed
annual  energy  purchase  was set  and  defined  as a proportion  of the
plant's production  capacity.  The Purchase  Agreement is  :o  be
entered into by TEK and the Project  Company  while the Turkish
Government  undertakes  to guarantee  all TEK obligations  to the
Project  Company  and  the  lenders  (in  the  event  of assignment)  and  to
-26-provide adequate  funds to  TEK  enabling it  to  fulfill its
obligations.
The price of energy must cover the operating costs and
feedstock  costs,  the debt service,  and a return  on equity  fixed
between  15X  and  20X. The  energy  price  is  expressed  in  a  convertible
currency  or in  a  basket  of  convertible  currencies  (the  European  ECU
has  been  used  in  some  proposals).  Either  TEK  undertakes  to  pay  for
the power purchased in convertible  currency,  or the government
provides  a guarantee  to the  Project  Company  for  the  conversion  into
hard  currencies  of  payments  in  local  currency  it  receives  from  TEK.
The consortia  have been requested  to submit  offers  based  on three
different  scenarios:  (i)  a  constant  energy  tariff  over  the  repayment
period  of the senior  debt, (ii)  a variable  tariff  over the said
period,  and (iii)  a tariff  based  on a 26 year term (which  implies
that the implementation  agreement  would have a 26 year period
instead  of the  15  year  period  initially  mentioned).
2.  Resere Fund: A "Reserve  Fund"  in  convertible  currency  is  to
be  set up prior to the plant's estimated commissioning  date,
initially  using shareholders'  equity.  The amount  of the  Reserve
Fund  is  to  be sufficient  to  cover:  (i)  all  debt  service  at the  date
of  the  first  installment  due  under  the  export  credit  agreements;  and
(ii)  by the  end  of 3  years  following  the  commissioning,  at Least  12
months forward  debt service  (two six-monthly  installments). The
Reserve  Fund is to be built  up so as to reach  this  minimum  amount
during the 3 year period from the commissioning,  primarily  by
allocation  of  profits  prior  to  any  distribution  to shareholders.
3.  Escrow  Accounts: All cash (whether  subscribed  as equity  or
paid  by TEK  under the  terms  of the Energy  Purchase  Agreement)  and
other  revenues  payable  to the  Project  Company  are  to be paid into
interest  bearing  accounts  (the  "Escrow  Accounts")  in  local  currency
-27-and  foreign  currency  with  an international  bank  acting  as  an escrow
agent. The  escrow  account  in  foreign  currency  is  to  be used  for  the
payment  of imported  equipment,  operating  costs  in  foreign  currency,
debt  service,  replenishment  of  the  Reserve  Fund  if  required,  agreed
return  on equity,  and repayment  of Turkish  subordinated  loans if
required.
4.  Subordinated  Loans: During  negotiations  of  the  first  projects
in  1986,  the  export credit agencies required some  form  of
unconditional guarantee from  the  Government.  The  Turkish
authorities  agreed  to make subo.dinated  loans  in foreign  currency
to the Project  Company  in order  to cover  revenue  shortfalls  under
certain  circumstances.  Such  subordinated  loans  are  to  be  reimbursed
by  the  Project  Company  in  the  event  its  default  is  established.
These  loans  are  to  be  provided  by  the  Public  Participation  and  Mass
Housing  Fund  (the  Fund).
The  repayment  of  subordinated  loans  should  be  borne  solely
through:  (i)  an  increase  in  the  energy  tariff  if  these  loans  are
required  by  reason  of  force  majeure  or  Government  default;  or  (ii)
reduced  dividends  to the Project  Company's  shareholders  if these
loans  are  required  for  any  other  reason. The  export  credit  agencies
agreed to consider  such subordinated  loans as equivalent  to a
sovereign  guarantee.  The question  remains  as to the conditions
under  which the subord'nated  loans are available  and up to what
amount.
(a)  Government  Default  and  Force  Maieure
The Turkish  authorities  agreed  that the subordinated
loans  should  be  made  available  at any  time  during  the  term  of
tne  project  in the event  of shortfalls  of cash flow  due to
government  default ("Fait du Prince") or  force majeure.
-28-Government  defaults  and force  majeure are defined in the
Implementation  Agreement.
The  definition  of  government  default  aims  at
safeguarding  the Project Company (through  the granting  of
subordinated  loans)  in the  event  of  any  action  or  inaction  of
governmental,  legislative,  judicial,  regulatory  agencies  or
other  public  authorities  in  Turkey  which  would  interfere  with
the  performance  of the  Project  in  a  way inconsistent  with its
financial  or technical  feasibility  and in a way  which  would
conflict  with the expressed  or implied  provisions  of the
Implementation  Agreement  or of any  of the  Project  Documents.
The  Government  defaults  may  also  include  any  failure  by
the Turkish  Government  or the Fund to make any payments  or
perform  any  obligations  necessary  for  the  performance  of the
project  under  any  contractual  documents.  The  promoters  and
export  credit  agencies  expressed  the  concern  that the  funds
be  piovided  unconditionally,  i.e.  regardless  of  any  discussion
or dispute  by the government  of its default.  This issue
remained  outstanding  in  most  projects  under  discussion.
(b)  Shortfalls  caused  by other  events
In any event other than Government  default  or force
majeure, a  subordinated loan  is  available during  the
construction  period and for a three year period from the
provisional  receipt  of the  plant  to  cover  shortfalls  in  the
Project  Company's  cash  flow.
-29-(c)  Available  Amkaunt
While  in  their  initial  proposal  the  Turkish  authorities
had  limited  the  amount  of the  subordinated  loans  to  an amount
equal  to  one  year  of debt  service,  they  now  seem  to agree  to
extend  tne  subordinated  loan  availability  to any shortfalls
of  cash  flow  without  limitation  to  the  debt  service  (including
payment  of operating  costs  or dividends,  and to extend  the
amount  of  guaranteed  debt  service  to  the  amount  of  the  reserve
fund  as  defined  abov.e.  However,  the later  position  of the
export  credit  agencies  was  that  the  subordinated  loans  should
guarantee  the  whole  amount  of  the  disbursed  export  credits.
The  provisions  of  the  documents  negotiated  with  the  Turkish
Government  as  of  this  writing  are  not  clear  in  this  respect.
5.  Foreign  Exchange  Guarantee:  The  Turkish  Government  is
granting a  guarantee of convertibility  of  local currency and
availability  of  convertible  currency  in  respect  of:  (i)  the  payments
due by TEK  in convertible  currency  under the Energy Purchase
Agreement,  and (ii) the remittances  to be made by the ?roject
Company  to its  shareholders  or to  any  other  foreign  party.
6.  Taxes  and  Duties: The  coal  fired  power  plants  are-  to  be  built
in designated  free zones.  The Prcifect  Company  will then  benefit
from all tax advantages  available  under the free zone regime
applicable  in Turkey including  exemption  from import duties on
equipment  and raw materials  (except  for 0.5X on CIF value), and
exemption  from  corporation  tax.  In  Turkey,  there  is currently  no
tax  on dividends  or on interest  paid  abroad.
7.  ATolicLble  Law  and  Resolution  of  Disnutes: The  Turkish  legal
system  derives  from  Swiss,  French  and  German  laws.  In  particular,
contractual  obligations  are governed  by the Code of Obligations
-30-which is inspired  from the relevant  Swiss Code.  Therefore,
reference  to the Turkish law, which seems unavoidable  in the
agreements  between the Project Company and the Turkish public
authorities,  should  not  constitute  a major  obstacle,  provided  that
protection  against adverse changes in laws or regulations  is
obtained  (e.g.  through  the  government  default  provisions)  and  that
a procedure  for  the  settlement  of disputes  before  a neutral  forum
is  agreed  upon.
In this regard,  particular  attention  must be given to the
rules  governing  the  execution  of  foreign  arbitral  awards  in  Turkey.
It must first  be noted  that the ICSID  Convention,  which  provides
adequate  procedures  for  the  settlement  of disputes  between  foreign
investors  and  the  host  state  and/or  the  execution  of the  awards,  was
signed  by Turkey  on June 24, 1987 and  ratified  on March 3, 1989.
Guarantees  deriving  from  Turkish  accession  to  the  ICSID  Convention
are thus  very recent. Turkey  is not a signatory  of the  New York
convention  on  enforcement  and  execution  of  foreign  arbitral  awards.
However,  under the Turkish  law (Law  No 2675 of May 20, 1982) a
foreign  award  may  be executed  by a Turkish  court  under  one  of the
following  conditions:
(i)  there  is a reciprocity  agreement  between  the  Republic
of  Turkey  and  the  state  in  which  the  award  is  rendered.
Turkey  has  signed  such  agreements  with  Austria,  Italy,
and  Romania.  However,  arbitral  awards  rendered  in  those
countries  are  not  executed  by the  Turkish  courts  if  they
were  rendered  under  international  rules  of arbitration
or under rules from a third  country.  Thus, certain
decisions  rendered  in Vienna in accordance  with the
regulations  of  the  International  Ar3itration  Institution
were  not  recognized  in  Turkey;
_.._(ii)  the  law  of the  state  where  the  award  is  rendered  allows
the  execution  of  decisions  awarded  in  Turkey  (principle
of reciprocity);  or
(iii)  in the  absence  of a provision  such  as mentioned  under
(ii) above, there are precedents  of such execution.
Based  on  these  grounds, reciprocal execution of
judgments  has been obtained  for decisions  rendered  in
certain  "cantons"  of Switzerland.
IV.  Concluding  Remarks
As of this  writing,  none  of the  major  BOT projects  has  been
finalized  ,  although  a "final"  stage  of  negotiations  between  certain
sponsors  and the  Ministry  of Energy  has  been  reached  on some  power
plant  projects. The  Ministry of  Finance has  the  following
explanation  for the  difficulty  which has been encountered in
concluding  BOT  deals.
In  the  offers  submitted  by  some  of  the  consortia,  the  Ministry
of Finance  found the cost of the plant to be significantly  more
expensive  than if the  plant  were  purchased  on a turn-key  basis  by
TEK. This resulted  from  the inclusion  by the  equipment  suppliers,
who are also  part  of the  BOT  consortia,  of a profit  margin  on the
equipment  in addition  to  provisions  in respect  of operating  risks.
Since,  as a result,  the cost of a power  plant is higher  than it
would  be  normally,  the  sponsor must  base  its  offer  on
unrealistically  high  production  forecasts  in  order  to  obtain  a low
level  of energy  tariff. Such  high capacity  utilization,  in turn,
would  reduce  the lifetime  of the  equipment  and require  its total
replacement  at the  end  of the  concession  period.
-32-Furthermore,  there  is speculation  that the  Japanese  bidders
may  bid at a loss  in  order  to gain  a reputation  in the  large  power
plant  market.  If this  were the  case,  the  energy  tariff  would  not
cover the true depreciation  value and may not allow the Project
Company  to  recover  its  costs,  including  costs  of  proper  maintenance
and  renewal  works  for  the  plant.
The security  package,  on which the various export credit
agencies  agreed  after  mutual  consultations,  results  in  the  transfer
of all the  risks  to the  Turkish  Government  including,  through  the
subordinated  loans,  an  unconditional  guarantee  for  the  repayment  of
all the  funds  disbursed  under  the  export  credit  (see  Section  III.4
above),  which  voids  to  a  large  extent  the  expected  advantages  of  the
BOT  formula.
As a provisional  conclusion,  it appears  that  BOT  projects  in
areas involving  heavy investment  in infrastructure  may not be
successfully  implemented  in Turkey  as long as the sponsors  and
lenders  are  not  prepared  to  take  risks  beyond  those  accepted  in the
proposals  discussed  to-date. Also,  the  Government  should  be ready
to let sponsors  keep  higher  profits  for  performance  exceeding  the
agreed  targets.  The multilateral  financial  institutions  of the
World  Bank  Group  may  help  to  increase  the  confidence  of  sponsors  and
lenders  in two  ways.  On the  one  hand,  by providing  support  to the
Government in  improving the  country's overall macroeconomic
situation  (in particular  the external  indebtedness)  and business
environment. On the  other  hand,  by supporting  specific  BOT  deals
through  hard currency  loans  or guarantees.
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Attachment
Letterseat  by  the  Kwatny  of  hug  to
the Consortia  bidding  for  ths  CUtrctio  Operation  of
Coal  fired  Pavor  stations
Dear  .. r.
r  am  pleased  to  inform you that  tho  GovernmeAt  of  Turkeyr
followinS  several  meetings  and  discussions  with  various
export-import  banks that  are  Interested In  lending  credits
to the  coastal  imported  coal-fired  power  stations  to  be
realized in  Turkey  via  O. T. scheme.  has decided to back up
the  projects  within  the  framework  of  limited  recourse
financina.  This  security  arrangement  and  our  new  energy
purchase  policy is  given  in  tho  Annex-I  to  this  letter.
Presently your  written  comments  supplied  to us  concerning
our draft agreements sent  to you on  October 16, 1986, are being
evaluated  and  reviewed. The revised  and final proposal  based
on the criteria  mentioned in the  attachment  to  this  letter
together  with  any  further  co-ments  on  our  draft  agreements
should  be  submitted  not  later  than  April  10, 1987.
The  following  criteria  are  the  most  important  issues  for  the
evaluation  and  solection of the  best  offer
1.  Sow  well  the  proposal  fits to  .0.  T.  concept and  how
close to non=recourse financing structure.
2  Are the major  prelim4-ary  commitment  letters  from  the
export-import banks submitted.
3. Given  the  technical  specifications  of the  project,
(AnneD-2)  does  the  proposal  offer the  best  price  of
electricity.  -34-Within  the  framework  of  these  principles  the  offers  will  be
ranrked and  priority for  negotiation  will  be  granted  to  the
consortium  which  has  the  beat  offer.  It  is  expected  that.
based  on  the  results  of  the  negotiation  held  with  the
first  consortium,  the  negotiations  will  be  carried  out  with
all the  other  consortia  concerned  depending  on the  electricity
demand  and  credit  availability.
Sincerely  Yours,
Undersecretary
Annex-I :  Notes  on  the  Security  Paclage  and  th  Energ  Purchase
Policy.
Azaex-2  :  Desisg  Principles  - Scope  of Work
cc:  State  Planning  Organization
O(nd*rsecretariate  of  Treasury  and Foreign  Trade
T1E  - Turkish Electricity  Authority
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to  the  Attachment
I. SECURITY ARRANGEMNETS
A. Subordinated  Loan  Obligations  of  the  Turkish  Government
The  Government of Turker  through the  Public Participation  Fund
shall provide Subordinated  Loans to the  Project Company in  the
event of shortfalls  in the  debt service escrow account for the
full  construction  period  plus  an  additional  period of  the
greater  of the first three years of operation  and/or  build up
of  the  reserve  fund to a level equal  to one year's forward debt
service.  Thereafter,  except in the  event  of shortfalls in the
debt service  escrow account  due to force  maJeure  or  government
default  and due  to  causes  which are  in  dispute, subordinated
loan obligations  would coaso.
B.  Ropayment  of Subordinated  Loans
The  repayment  of  subordinatod  loans  along  with  any  interest
and  costs  associated  with  utilization  thereof  shall  be
i.  borne  solely  in  the  energy  tariff, if such  financing
is required  by reason  of  force maJeure or  government
default.
ii.  borne  solely  through dividends  of investors, if  such
financing  is  required  for  any  other  reason.
C. The ProJect  Agreements
The  Turkish  Government,  through  the  appropriate  agencies shall
participate  in  the  following  agreements:
li.  Implementation  Agreement
2. Energsy  Sales  Agreement
The Undersecretariate  of  Treasury and  Foreign Trade
will  guarantee  the  TEK's  payment  obligations  under  this
agreesent.
3. Escrow  and  Subordinated  Loan  Agreements
The  parties  to  this  agreement  will  be  the  Ministry  of
Energy  and  Natural  Resources,  the  Project  Cowpany, the
Public  Participation  Fund  Administration  (PPiA),  Senior
Lenders,  and  the  Escrow  Agent. The  subordinated  loan
obligations  of  the  PPFA  under  this  agreement  will  be
guaranteed  by  the  Undersecretariate  of  Treasury  and
Foreign  Trade.
-36-D.  Escrow  Accounts
1.  TEK  Reserve  Account
This account  will be  funded  from:
i.  capital  charge  component  of  the  tariff  before
comercial operation  date,
i$.  capital  charge  component  of the  tariff  corresponding
to  the  onergy  purchased  by TEX  above  the  guaranteed
annual  not generation  level after the  commercial
operation  date.
2.  Dividend  Escrow  Account
The  dividends  of  the  iAvestors  will  be  accumulated  in
this  account  and  the  liquidation  of  it  is  up  to
shareholders  and  senior  lenders.
3.  Debt  Service  Reserve  Account
Thlnis  account  will  be  funded  equally  from  (1)  and  (2)
above  until  the  needed  amount  is  accumulated.
4. Installment  or  Debt  Service  Escrow  Account
1I.  PURCHASE OF ENERGY
T.E.K.  shall  purchase  from  the  Project  Company  any  and  all
amounts  of  energy  made  available  from  the  project.  The  energy
tariff  will  be  calculated  based  upon  an  agreed  guaranteed
annual  net  generation  of  energy  produced  from  the  project.
T.E.K. shall  par  for  the  guaranteed  annual  net  generation  of
energy,  provided  that  this  amount  was  made  available  by  the
Project  Company.  The  tariff  for  the  energy  purchased  by  T.E.K.
above  the  guaranteed  annual  net  generation  level  shall  be
based  on  the  incremental  costs  of  producing  the  excess  energy
plus  return  on  equity  of  the  investors.
III.  THE ENERGY  TARIFF
The  consortia  are requested  to  offer  a  constant  onergy  tariff
over  the  repayment  period  of  the  senior  debt. However, they
have  the  option  to  offer  a  variable  tariff  over  the  said
period.  The  consortia  have  also  the  option  to  calculate  the
electricity  price  on  a  26-year  basis.  Th.  tariff  shall  be  based
on  February  1987 prices and  should  be  quoted  in  original
currency  or currencies.  The  detailed  cash  flow  analysis  for  the
period  in  concern  shall  also  be  submitted  together  with
relevant  sensitivity  analysis.
IV. COMMITHENT LETTERS
The  major  preliminary  codmitaent  letters  from  tho  export-import
banks  and  the  equity  commitment  letters  of  the sponsors should
be enclosed  to tho  proposal.  _37-V.  OTHER  ISSUES
The  following  criteria  should  be  taken  into consideration  in
the  preporation  of the  revised  proposal  ;
1.  The  construction  cost  should be in  February  1987 prices
in conformitY  with  tho  Design  Principles  - Scope  of Work  given
in  Annex-2  and  the  proposed escalation factors and  formula
should  be given.
2. The  details of the  breakdown  of the  total  investment  cost
and  operation  and  maintenance  costs  including  the  number ot
employees  and  personnel  should  be stated.
3. If  the port  facility  is  to be constructed  by  a  seperate
company, the breakdown of the total investment cost  of the port
should  be given  and the  handling  fee  per  ton  of  coal  based  on
this  cost should  be stated.
4.  Every  and  each  assumption  taken  into consideration  for  the
financial  analysis  should  be  clearly  explained.
5.  Any further technical specifications  should  be  enclosed.
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Activities in  Developing Countries, May 1989" published
by US AID Office of Energy.
O  "The Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) Concept:  New
Financing Approach for ASEAN Utilities?"  A paper by
Kodiat Samadikun, Manager, General Planning Division,
State Electricity Corporation of Indonesia.
O  "Cash and Carry Project Finance."  An article by
Richard Norton in  Trade Finance & Banker International,
September 1989.
o  "An Overview of the French System of Concession of Pub-
lic Works and Services."  A paper by Jean-Jacques
Lecat, Bureau Francis Lefebvre, Paris, France, forth-
coming.
-40-B.  COAFERENCE  MATERIALS
1.  THE SECOND  INTERNATIONAL  CONSTRUCTION  PROJECTS
CONFERENCE,  LONDON,  JUNE  5 AND  6, 1989
o  "BOT - The Host  Country's  Perspective  - Pakistan.'
Talk by M. Akram Khan, Advisor, Pakistan Ministry of
Water and Power, Islamabad.
O  "BOT - The Host Country's Perspective - Malaysia.'
Talk by Mohamad Hanafiah Omar, Head of Malaysian
Privatization Unit, Prime Minister's Office Kuala
Lumpur.
o  "Limited  Recourse Projects - The Contractor's Perspec-
tive."  Talk bv Nick Harding, Director, Wimpey Project
Finance Ltd., London (synopsis and full text).
o  "The tFC's View of BOT - Past Projects and Future
Plans."  Talk by Peter Jones, Head of Corporate Finance
Services, IFC (outline, synopsis, and full text).
O  "Perspective  of the Contractor as the Investor."  Talk
by  Jean Rena lt, Joint Directeur General, Spie
Batignolles, S.A., Paris.
O  "Managing  Major Projects."  Talk by James Rowings, CCL
Construction Consultants, Inc., Kansas City.
O  "The Channel Tunnel - Lessons From The Management of
Europe's Largest BOT Project:  Eurotunnel."  Talk by
Martin Hemmingway, Deputy Commercial and Marketing
Director, Eurotunnel plc, London.
O  "Financing Issues on BOT and Other Non-Recourse
Projects."  Talk by Patrick Crawford, Director, Morgan
Grenfell & Co., Ltd., London.
O  "New Insurance Schemes for Overseas Construction
Projects."  Talk by Tom Jaffray, Head of Marketing and
Business Development, ECGD Project Group, London.
o  "New Insurance Approaches to the Pre- and Post- Comple-
tion Risks in BOT Projects."  Talk by Anthony J. South.
Director, SPONSOR - Overrun Risk Protection Limited,
London.
o  "The Special Legal Considerations for BOT and Other
Non-Recourse Finance."  Talk by Steven Beharrell, Part-
ner, Denton Hall Burgin and Warrens, London.
-41-o  "Security for Performance of BOT and Other Interna-
tion-,1  Contracts."  Talk by Andrew Foyle, Partner,
Lo,  .1  White Durrant, London (outline and full text).
O  "Structuring  of Construction Pt-ojects  and the Role of
Standard Forms."  Talk by Professor John Uff, Q.C.,
Head of Center for Construction Law and Project Manage-
ment, Kings College, London.
o  "Build-Own-and-Transfer Schemes (BOT) and the con-
straints on their use for implementing infrastructure
projects in developing countries."  A talk by
Ibrahim I. Elwan, World Bank.
o  "BOT-The Host Country's Perspective:  Turkey."  A paper
prepared by Dr. Ibrahim Cakir, State Planning
Organisation, Turkey.
O  "BOT - An Overview of Current Projects and Possibili-
ties."  A talk by David Suratgar, Morgan Grenfell,
London.
o  "Funding and Organisation of Major BOT Construction
Projects."  A talk by Joseph Ferrigno, Kumaga2 Cumi
Co., Ltd.
o  "BOT in the UK - The Dartford Crossing."  A talk by
Michael Barnett, Assistant Director, Kleinwort Benson,
London.
o  "The Department of Trade and Industry's View on the
Future of BOT and International Construction."  A talk
by Christian Adams, Head of Projects and Export Policy
Division, Department of Trade and Industry, London.
O  "Structuring BOT Projects:  Resolving the Jigsaw."  A
talk by Adrian Montague, Linklaters & Paines, London.
2.  INTERNATIONAL  PRIVATE  POWER  DEVELOPNENT  AND
FINANCE  CONFERENCE,  SANTA  CLARA,  CALIFORNIA,
JUNE  19, 1989
o  "Necessary Components of Successful Privatization in
Developing Nations."  Talk by William Stevenson, Vice
President and Manager International Projects, Bechtel
Financing Services, Inc.
o  "Experience and Concerns of Developing Nations Regard-
ing Privatization."  Talk by Ernesto M. Aboitiz, Presi-
dent, National Power Corporation, Philippines.
-42-o  "Project Developers Perspective of Privatization."
Talk by Henry Townsend, Senior Vice President, Interna-
tional  isiness  Development, Bechtel Power Corp.
O  "Financing Requirements for Successful Privatization
Projects."  Talk by Ibrahim Elwan, Chief, Energy Opera-
tions Division, World Bank.
O  "International  Private  Power  Development  and  the Role
of the U.S. Agency for International  Development."
Paper presented by Alexander R. Love, Counselor to the
United States Agency for International  Development.
C.  COUNTRY  MATERIALS
1.  COSTA RICA
o  "The Costa Rica Combination."  An article in Worldwide
Projects, August/September 1986.
O  "Evaluation of the Divestiture Program of Corporacion
Costarricense de Desarrollo, S.A. ("CODESA")."  A
report prepared by Alexander C. Tomlinson and Ismael
Benavides, Center for Privatization for the Bureau for
Private Enterprise, USAID, May 1988.
2.  GUINEA
o  "Staff  Appraisal Report, Republic of Guinea, Second
Water Supply Project."  A report  prepared for internal
World Bank use by the Occidental and Central Africa
Department, Infrastructure  Operations Division, World
Bank, January 9, 1989.
o  "The Privatization of the Urban Water Supply Sector in
Guinea."  Paper written for the World Bank by Alain
Locussol, sanitary engineer, African Infrastructure
Operations Division, World Bank.
3.  INDONESIA
o  "Public  Debate Grows Over Possible Plant Order."  An
article in Nuclear News, October, 1989.
o  "Foreign Investors Invited to Develop Public Works
Projects."  An article in the Jakarta Post, January 21,
1987.
-43-4.  IVORY COAST
o  "Report and Recommendation of the President of the
International  Bank for Reconstraction and Development
to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Water Supply
and Sewerage Sector Adjustment Loan in an Amount Equiv-
alent to U.S.$65 Million to the Republic of the Ivory
Coast."  February 5, 1986.
o  "Concession  du Service de Distribution Publique Urbaine
d'Eau Potable en Cote D'Ivoire."  Prepared by the Min-
istry  of Public Works and Transport of the Republic of
the Ivory Coast, October, 1987.
5.  MALAYSIA
o  "Malaysia  Highway Finance Runs Well."  An Article i,>
Trade Finance, March 1989.
o  "North-South  and New Klang Valley Inter Urban Toll
Expressway Programme, Peninsular Malaysia."
o  "Malaysian BOT on the Road."  An article in Trade
F.nance, July 1988.
O  "Malaysia  Toll Road Case Study."  A study prepared by
the World Bank.
O  "Malaysia:  Toll Road Experience."  An article written
by Maurice Le Blanc of the World Bank.
6.  PAKISTAN
o  "Pakistan:  Enter the Private Sector."  An article by
Christina Lamb in  The Financial Times, Survey, p.20,
July 3, 1989.
u  "Recent  Developments in the Electricity Supply
Industry in the Developing Countries."  An article by
Mr. Ibrahim.Elwan,  Division Chief, Energy Operations
Division, World Bank.
7,  PHILIPPINES
o  "Philippines  Goes Private Too."  An article in Engi-
neering  News-Record, October 27, 1988.
O  "Prequalification  Documents for the Supply of 300-MW
Capacity from Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plants on a
Build,  Operate and Transfer ("BOT"), or Build, Own and
-44-Operate ("BOO")  Basis."  Documents prepared by the
National Power Corporation of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines,  March 1989.
o  "Executive Order No. 215: Amending Presidential Decree
No. 40 and Allowing the Private Sector to Generate
Zlectricity."
o  "Rules and Regulations to Implement  Executive Order No.
215 on Private Sector Participation in Power Genera-
tion."  Prepared by the Office of Energy Affairs,
National Power Corporation and National Electrification
Administration in the Philippines.
O  "NPC Prequalifies Bidders."  An article in Coal Week
International,  July 11, 1989.
O  "New  Concept For Private Ports Favored."  An article by
Casiano A. Navarro in  Manila Bulletin, October 11,
1988.
8.  THAILAND
o  "The  New Expressway Project - Project Brief.  Presenta-
tion to Investors and Lead Managers."  A project brief
prepared by the Bangkok Expressway Company Limited,
September 1988.
o  "AEC Clarifies'Skytrain Finance Package  Details."  An
article in the Bangkok Post, November 5, 1988.
9.  TURKEY
o  "Turkish BOT Projects Are Making Firms Leery."  An
article in Engineering  News-Record, November 9, 1989.
O  "Turkey Taps New Group for First Large BOT Plan."  An
article in  Engineering News-Record,  November 2, 1989.
O  "Japan to Build Thermal Power Plant in Turkey."  An
article from Jiji Press Ticker Service,  October 23,
1989.
O  "How Turkey Forces Powerful Partnerships."  An article
by Jim Bodgener in  The Financial Times, Section 1, p.8,
June 9, 1989.
o  "Saga of the Year: BOT in the Balance."  Article in
Trade Finance, July 1988.
-45-o  "The  Turkish BOT Power Project Experience.'n An article
for the 1989 Edition of Power Generation TechnoloQy
(Sterling  Publications Ltd., London) by William E.
Stevenson, Vice Prs3ident and Manager, Bechtel Financ-
ing Services, Inc., May 26, 1989.
O  'The  Privatization Boom."  An article by Candace Port
in  Worldwide Proiects Vol. 13, November 3, 1986.
O  'The  Ozal Formula:  Build-Operate-Transfer."  A report
by Donald Whittaker.
o  "Turkey's  New Approach to Project Financing."  An arti-
cle by Stephan Pellay in Development  Business,
Febriary 13, 1987.
O  "Turkey - Where Have All the Big Loans Gone?"  An arti-
cle by Francesca Carnevale in  Trade Finance, June 1988.
O  "Sea-Pac Bids Low for BOT, or Does It?"  An article in
Trade Finance, September 1987.
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